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THE CHAPLAIN AND THE ACUTELY DISTURBED PATIENT

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The pastor serving in a psychiatric hospital has occasions of contact with persons in acute and severe distress. Often, he is called into these situations by a physician who has noted the rich flow of religious allusions, preoccupations, and delusions. At times, these referrals may be made under some medical urgency, as a last-ditch psychological resort before instituting forceful measures to interrupt prolonged fasting, or to prevent dangerous dehydration or a panicky suicide by exhaustion. On some occasions the chaplain's contact with acute and severe disturbance may come from the sudden disorganization of a patient whose personality resources prove suddenly inadequate to the covert stresses of his life. (It is probably in this last category that the parish pastor will find some useful similarity to the occasional sudden decompensation of a person in the community.)

It is to such situations that this paper addresses itself. Three brief incidents in a hospital ministry are noted with a brief discussion of the significance of these clinical pastoral summaries.

Incident 1

Mr. C.W.V.—This patient, whom I have known since his admission six

years ago, intercepted me in the canteen this morning, indicating that he wanted to "talk about an experience." I deferred him, making a date for coffee at 3:30 today. The whole contact was treated in the casual, jocular way which has been the patient's choice in previous contacts.

At 1:15 he came to my office. We talked until about 2:30, at which time I indicated my willingness to continue the conversation, but only on another day. The suggestion to end the visit made no impression on the patient. Taking a cue from his expressed request that "I take control," I called the nursing office, secured help in getting him back to his ward. The patient's response to my standing up, opening the door, and other plain indications that the visit was at an end was a kind of passive, affectionate, negativistic resistance. He was returned to the ward by an aide, and the ward physician was given a brief report of the incident by phone, including some of the suicidal ruminations.

The patient began the conversation by saying, "I'm not here to give you any more B.S. I'm here for you to speak. I don't dare talk anymore." With this, he put his hand over his mouth as though to prevent any more talking. After a moment's pause, he went on, hand over mouth:

Patient: I'm not in control, are you in control? . . . control . . . control . . . control . . . control . . . etc. . . . If I were in my office, I wouldn't just sit here like you are now and not taking control.

Chaplain: I am in control, Mr. V. (with this, he jumped up, pounded my knee)

P: Oh, my God, my God, my God . . God . . . my . . . God. (He continued to perseverate on the word "God," repeating it in a kind of sing-song fashion as he lifted his pudgy bulk into unusual activity; making several attempts to rub against me in my chair. Then attempts to touch my hair. Then a few minutes standing on one foot, his other foot extended backwards, his head and face leaning precariously over me.)

C: (When he would not respond to gently firm suggestions that he sit down, I directed him most forcefully but verbally.) I will not talk to you if you are going to try and be higher than I am, nor if you try to make yourself lower than I am. If we talk it will be on the same level, as two human beings.

P: (At this comment from the chaplain, the patient literally recoiled into his chair, sitting with his hand again over his mouth.) Oh, oh, oh, oh, oh . . . you don't know what you have said. You don't know what it is all about.

(The patient's recoil seemed to have been triggered by the chaplain's comment about being a "human being" and it was at this point that my intuition told me that he was struggling with the experience of being some great personage, certainly not himself. This intuition was confirmed as we went along, becoming clear in his ruminations about a picture of Jesus on the office wall. It became evident that he had some notion of himself as the Christ.)

C: Now, just a minute, Mr. V. I do know what it is all about. I am

going to talk about it because I am not afraid of it. Something has made you give up all the B.S. about being a big lawyer . . .

P: (Interrupting) . . . Last night, I almost died. (Much talk about his bad heart, much puffing as he talked, holding his left chest, much talk about his big belly, but always he returned to the "experience.") I've talked to God and I've decided to quit trying to be a big lawyer with an office and law books. I'm no good and I haven't got long to live . . . (Here his hand went back over his mouth, indicating a noticeable "break" in the level of his functioning.) I'm here now, and you're in control. Give me a consultation. Help! Help!

C: All right. I'll take over. I'll tell you what I know to be true. You've given up what you tried to hold on to—being a big lawyer—and that makes sense because you haven't been able to practice for a long time. But this has left you empty. You don't have to fill that emptiness with the idea that came to you last night. We are just two human beings . . .

(Much of the subsequent conversation revolved around this theme: that he was troubled with some unspeakable thought of his own importance. It became apparent that this thought was troubling him whenever he put his hand over his mouth and started to whisper. These notes are based on immediate recall and memory blocks out many details. I had the impression that the intolerable thoughts not only concerned his feeling of importance as the Son of God, but also had relationship to some intolerable aspect of his relationship to his mother. In any case, whenever his hand would go over his mouth and his voice would drop to a whisper I would interrupt, brusquely if necessary, using the metaphoric language of his religious concerns to remind him that there was "one God, one Jesus, one creation . . . we are just people, God's children, all of us." On one occasion, the parable of the Prodigal Son furnished the mutually understood allusions in which we communicated. The end point of this excursion into the parable was the conclusion that the father gave to the returning son, not "because the no-good son talked him into it but because the father decided in his forgiveness to do so." The ability of the father to resist the son's blandishments seemed to speak to Mr. V.'s concerns at that moment.)

(Characteristically, Mr. V. would respond to these metaphoric denials of his grandiosity by warm, responsive agreement and an audible, sighing release of tension, "You're right, you're all right. You've said it right . . ." Then, as it seemed, you could almost "see" him shift from primary process thinking. He would shake his head, as though coming out of the water, and ask, almost dazedly, "What was that you said?" When the comment was repeated to him, he would say, "Now that doesn't make sense! Not at all." As the hour progressed I found a usable combination for dealing with this wide variation in his functioning: To speak in the broadest, most fluid, metaphoric, declamatory fashion using the basic metaphors of religion when he was functioning at the primary process level. Then, when the "break" seemed sealed up, to speak in rationally interpretative ways of why he was experiencing such distress. Typical of this kind of interchange was one involving a picture of Jesus hanging on the office wall, and a picture of my two children sitting on the office bookcase.)

P: (pointing to Jesus) Whose son is this?

C: That is Jesus Christ, the only-begotten son of God.

P: (taking picture of my children in his hands) Whose children are these?

C: Those are my children, Mr. V. (Then followed several minutes in which he seemed to seize on the conversational subject of my children and, although under some pressure, the conversation was within normal bounds. Such avoidance would not hold, however, and he slipped into manneristic manipulating of the pictures; arms outstretched, elaborately stylized retreats for perspective, taking them from the hook and changing places, etc.)

P: (taking children's picture and handing it to me) Those are yours . . . yours . . . yours . . . yours. (Taking picture of Jesus from the wall) Now then, whose picture is this . . . is this . . . is this?

C: That picture is of Jesus who died and was buried in the city of Jerusalem in the year 32 A.D. The Bible says he was born in a little city of Bethlehem. Here, I'll show you on the map. (I take out a convenient Bible Lands atlas.)

P: (He responds with a few minutes of calm interest in the concrete details of the Holy Land. I have him handle and turn the pages of the book himself, asking him to point out things by touching the map. Then . . .) No . . . no . . . no . . . You don't understand the picture . . . the picture . . . the picture. (Hands over mouth, voice to a whisper, talking rhythmically; takes picture of Jesus, holds it to his chest, pointing with a charade-like urgency) You say it. You see it; say it . . . you say it . . . say it . . . I'm not a big lawyer but you see . . . say it.

C: I can see just two things . . . but first, take a hymnal right there (I take a hymnal, open it to the Apostles' Creed, draw a big circle around the phrase concerning Jesus, " . . . only begotten Son of God.") Now you draw a circle—heavy lines around the word "only."

P: Do you know that is true (with great direct intensity)?

C: I know that to be true.

P: (great sighing release of tension, he slumps in his chair) Thank God . . . Thank God. (Shakes his head, after a moment) What did you say just then . . . Now that doesn't make sense.

(This kind of insistent refusal to accept his tentative grandiosity seemed to penetrate after a while and the periods of calm became longer. Those periods were filled with tears, despair, hitting himself with his hand on the head, "I'm finished. I want to die and be with mother." During his restless wanderings around the office he had at one time climbed up on the secretary's desk and I had climbed onto my desk, so that we talked across the room, refusing to allow the patient to assume a position of physical superiority to confirm his threatening sense of grandiosity. Again, during his wanderings, he found a bottle of communion wine and in connection with the despairing times of calm he would open it up and consider taking a drink.)

C: You have used bottles like that before to escape facing yourself, Mr. V. You don't have to anymore. You're not as great as you feel when you're drunk, and you're not as low as when you've been on a drunk for a while. You're just a human being.

(Woven through the hour was a concern for his mother. He would interrupt his pacing to finger the women's choir robes in the closet, sniff them, "I've got to make a full confession [burying his face in the empty robes]. Mother would want that . . . Oh, I've disappointed her. She wanted me to be honest and good. I've done things . . ." Then, he would come back to the window, stand with arms outstretched, like a suppliant, strike his head, flex his arms, heft his paunch, moan, "She can hear me . . . can hear me [voice dropping to a whisper, hands to mouth] . . . can she?")

C: The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. Your mother is in heaven, Mr. V. She is not worrying any more. In God's house are many rooms and He is caring for her there. You cannot worry her anymore. She has gone up into heaven. She is beyond your reach.

P: You're right . . . (release) . . . What did you say? . . . Now that doesn't make sense. Did you know my mother before she died?

C: No, I didn't, Mr. V. Tell me about her. When did she die?

P: (Elaborates on details of his memory of his mother, her death, etc.)

(Through the hour there was no clear impression conveyed of what precipitated this acute and severe break. There was mention of his son, of events on the ward, of his plans for an offgrounds job. The patient was not able to offer any sequential hint of the cause of his distress. The immediate struggle to maintain his contact with reality seemed to take all of his energy. My impression was that the prospect of taking an offground job in a non-professional capacity was coupled with some keen awareness of body functions, perhaps an episode of heart palpitations.)

Two hours after this session Mr. V. returned to the office unaccompanied, his behavior on return to the ward having been so normal that the aide had not checked the phone order book, and had released him on his regular ground privilege pass.

P: You did right today. This has been a tremendous day. You saved me from going crazy. I've never been an alcoholic (his admission diagnosis); I've been crazy and just waiting for it to catch up with me, but you stopped me today. (We made a date for another day and I accompanied the patient to the ward.)

Incident 2

Miss M.S.T. is a 23-year-old white single patient who was first admitted to the hospital seven years ago. Left at home with her father and two younger siblings, the patient had shown a marked and steady deterioration for six months prior to admission. The occurrence of symptoms seemed to be connected with the departure of the mother, who was in a psychiatric hospital (schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type, chronic, severe). Also at this

same time an older brother was married and left home. By the time of admission Miss T. was spending her days in mute isolation, stolidly performing her chores as mother-big-sister-high-school student. On rare occasions this retreat was broken by brief periods of destructive rage. In the hospital she was treated with insulin coma plus an active milieu program which encouraged many staff people to interrupt her day with specific visits, activities, plans. Under this regimen the patient had a remission and was discharged to her home. Her father, brother, and the pastor of her local Protestant church were oriented so that each might continue the kind of supportive-interruptive relationship which she had found in the hospital. During this first hospitalization the chaplain made the normal initial visit and joined in the supportive-interruptive milieu by bi-weekly visits.

Miss T. was returned to the hospital for a second visit two years ago. Again, she was isolated, stubbornly uncommunicative, but on only one occasion did she become excited and loudly abusive. She reported difficulties on her bookkeeping job. She had reacted by deciding that the job was too complicated for her and transferred to a routine clerking position. In addition, her father had died suddenly; her mother more expectedly in heart failure associated with a spectacular obesity and lethargy. Miss T. had remained the house mother for her younger siblings, who were now in high school. At the diagnostic conference following this second admission her condition was classified: schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type. On the first admission she had been diagnosed: schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type.

During the monthly serving of the Lord's Supper in the regular morning chapel service the usual invitation was given to come to the altar rail if any would receive the communion elements. Miss T. was noted in the first group to take their places kneeling. It was noted that she moved with tight stylized rigidity, avoiding contact with other communicants—observing them only—by a massive turning of her head and shoulders. The same flaccid rigidity marked her kneeling at the rail. She preempted an empty place at the exact center of the rail and moved toward it with the unwavering slow momentum of a liner easing into a dock. This quality of ponderous symmetry in her movements was reflected in her actions kneeling: she moved her head in a tightly balanced eighth turn to the right then, slowly, with exactness, she swung it to the left. This was repeated several times. As the chaplain moved down the line of communicants, serving them, he could see Miss T. fold her hands, fingers together, as in prayer. With symmetrical exactness she slowly moved these downwards to the altar rail, then to the bare floor under her knees. Her finger tips revealed that the central crack between the floor boards was slightly off center from her position and she moved—slowly, slightly, but with ponderous exactness—directly over this crack. This was the signal for a complete change in her expression. During her approach to the altar the patient conveyed the sense of a tensely fragile crystalline structure where opposing forces were barely maintained in balance. Now it was as though she had arrived at dead center; in this autistically created nadir the tense energies were at rest. Her face sagged into the mute detachment reminiscent of her admission. Gone was the taut equilibrium of eye movements. Now she gazed emptily and fixedly ahead.

The chaplain sensed an acute crisis. The memory of impressions probably sharpened in the several hours before these notes were written. However, a

tape recorder was on during the service. Nearly all of the following conversation can be reconstructed from its faint record. None of this was in mind as he approached the kneeling Miss T. Associations at this time can be summarized: She cannot move herself . . . The altar and her coming are infused with her forbidding fantasies . . . But I can move freely in this holy place . . . I must approach her clearly down the mid-line and interrupt her from there. Only in that tiny "fovea" is there a pin-point of "contact."

Accordingly, when the chaplain finished serving the wine-intincted bread to the person next to Miss T. he stepped back a full step and studiedly lined up with the patient. Then, taking a wafer of bread from the serving lip of the chalice, he held it toward her.

C: This is bread, Marcia . . . Take it in your hand and feel it. (Her attention was predominantly directed inward and it was only very slowly that she directed her attention outwards.) It is a thin piece of bread . . . like a cracker. (She takes the wafer.) It is real. You can feel it, can't you?

P: (slowly after a long pause) Yes. (She turns the wafer in her fingers so that it is held by the edge with the thin flat surface aligned with the "mid line.")

C. (reaching out to touch her hand lightly) I am Rev. Klink. I am the minister. You may move and eat the cracker of bread. (She slowly puts it in her mouth.) Can you taste it? (Her nod is barely perceptible.) God has given us many feelings. They are ways we know things are real. You've eaten bread before, haven't you? (Nods slowly.) You can feel your knees on this hard floor, too. Nothing has changed. You were frightened when you came up here today. (Here her eyes darted up in quick suspicion.) I will see you after the service. (She shifts on her knees.) You are getting back your feelings. Here is the wine. Drink it and taste it. It tastes different than the bread, doesn't it . . .

P: (shaking her head, like a dog emerging from a bath) Yes. I'm all right now.

C: You may rise and go in peace. (She does, with striking freedom of movement.)

Incident 3

Mrs. M.G.S.—The admitting physician called to report a 36-year-old woman admitted as an emergency two days previously, in an acute schizophrenic reaction now refusing to eat unless she could see a priest. The social history revealed a woman who was not a Roman Catholic but who had made contact with a local priest shortly before her acute break; therefore, the doctor was interested not only in the feeding problem but fearful of catering to a demand which seemed to be involved in a delusional attempt to cope with overwhelming stresses. He preferred to avoid tube or intravenous feedings.

I saw the patient on the admission ward where she was—a tall, somewhat thin, well-dressed girl whose face was marked with old scars of acne. She was seated alone at one end of the ward reading a Bible. She talked readily

with a few gross distortions, occasionally breaking over into tears. She indicated that she had been raised in the town of P———; had attended a Presbyterian church as a youngster; spoke warmly of the minister there. Married early after becoming pregnant. Marriage has been reasonably happy, with three children. Husband's work has taken him around Midwest; family has followed. Has never attended church. The patient has worked, usually as a business machine operator, during most of married life. Immediately prior to hospitalization she had been unable to work, had wandered off, reporting bizarre episodes of promiscuity with male "pick-ups." In her marital relationships she became suddenly very demanding of her husband, but remained quite unresponsive to his sexual attentions. The abrupt change in her functioning seems to date from the discovery that her 18-year-old son's best friend had probably been responsible for the pregnancy of a high-school classmate.

Through all the recital of her brief history the patient offered such comments as "I don't know what to do," "I can't understand it" (pointing to the open Bible on her lap), "I've always been like this, sort of a confused kid," "I wanted to become a Catholic and take instruction so I'd know what to do." It became apparent that superficially her refusal to eat was the result of a misapprehension that she had to fast before making a confession. I corrected her on this, indicated the schedule of services for Catholic patients, and then, using her words, reflected: "I gather, aside from the religious concern, that things seem to have been coming too fast for you to feel that you can make sense out of them." This seemed to strike a responsive chord and she said, "I've just had the same amount of work to do lately but it hasn't felt right. I've wanted a rest." In the light of this, I very firmly suggested that it was understandable that she should want to simplify her concerns so she could, with help, "catch up." I outlined the admission work-up process to her and the probability that it would be four weeks before her diagnostic staff. I suggested to her that she get her feet on the ground in the routine of the hospital and plan to discuss with Dr. X her felt needs about a change of churches. In the meanwhile either I or Father P. could be reached by the aides on the ward if there was something special. Meanwhile I directed her Bible reading to a few passages which she said were familiar and firmly encouraged her to read only one chapter per day, repeat the Lord's prayer and then ask the aide for a job to help with. We read the Lord's Prayer together. Then she closed the Bible with an air of deep meaningfulness.

The nursing report indicated that she ate her supper that night and asked "what she might do" on the ward. Assigned to simple housekeeping tasks, she seems to be much more relaxed and at ease. Meanwhile her work-up interviews continue with the doctor.

Discussion

The three summaries above illustrate a number of items of significance to the pastor. More complete discussion of the points may be found in certain articles and books listed below in the footnotes.

When Mr. V. (No. 1 above) sought an appointment with the chap-

lain he gave no evidence of unusual stress. It would appear that the degree of stress combined with the prospect of a meeting to wipe out his inner controls. This was first evident in his early arrival and again in his initial remarks: "I don't dare talk anymore . . . I'm not in control." It was as though, once the "door" of meeting was opened, he was unable to restrain the "gush" of inner turmoil. The desperate need for the chaplain (or anyone) to assume control of the situation is clearly evident in the relief which the patient demonstrates after testing the chaplain's perception of the depth of his disorganization. Such occasions are no time for passive, encouraging listening—even though the worker may experience a kind of child-like satisfaction in playing the roles a patient's fantasy thrusts upon him. The diffuse character of the emotional life of persons in such a state must be clearly recalled. The articulation of such differentiated emotional states as love and hate comes from a relatively late developmental period. In acute excitement these ordinarily differentiated emotions tend to be fused together again, and, with the kind of polymorphous perversity attributed by Freud to neonatal development,[1] they search for expression.

Many pastors have been trained to listen, reflect and elicit feelings. Whatever merit this method may have in other situations and for other workers, it does not appear to be useful in the chaplain's work with acute disturbance. A useful analogy can be found by most parents in their dealings with a normal child through various phases of development. At first, almost any emotional display of the infant is accepted with all of its diffuse disorganization. But gradually, as the child acquires some sense of its various identities (sexual, social, familial, etc.), the parents support the articulation and definition of emotional expressions differentiated in keeping with the child's growing sense of his own identity. The discovery of non-plastic and stable identity among the persons and objects of the child's world reinforces his growing structure of selfhood. Such self-revelation on the part of parents, measured to coordinate with the child's developing readiness for it, is not to be confused with rejection or over-strictness. (To paraphrase the classic oedipal dilemma, there comes a time when the son is ready to hear from his father the action-equivalent of the words: "No, you may not be mother's lover. She is mine, as lover. She is yours as mother. Those are different relationships. They can live together in the same house.") Such an analogy has useful bearing on episodes of acute disturbance if we understand such disturbance as sudden decompensation from more adult ways of behaving (and literally, perceiving) to more primitive, infantile levels. The needs expressed in such situations demand that the chaplain firmly "reveal" himself to the patient, offering his own unshakeable sense of identity, limits, differentiated ideas to the patient.

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[1] S. Freud: *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality;* London, Imago, 1905. Also Heinz Werner: *Comparative Psychology of Mental Development* (Rev. Ed.); Follett, New York, 1948.

To understand decompensation in a useful way, the chaplain needs acquaintance with more than the psychosexual *content* of earlier levels of development. He needs to recall the fundamentally unique ways of thinking characteristic of earlier stages of development.[2] The propinquity of these stages to each other, but their clear difference, is dramatically illustrated in the repeated sense of incongruity which Mr. V. indicates as he moves back and forth from levels of functioning. We have already indicated that one of the characteristics of genetic development is the increasing specificity and articulation of emotions. Conversely, the emotions of more primitive levels of development are global, more diffuse, less differentiated. *The basic helping tack in such situations is to aid the person in maintaining his awareness of the distinction between his fluctuating levels of functioning.*

When dealing with the apparent pressure to perceive a specific object or event diffusely—and thus to detach further the self from reality—it has seemed most helpful to this writer to *return to the concrete.* Thus, in the incident of Miss T., the chaplain interrupts a threatening break into "diffuseness" by a few very concrete reminders about the least abstract, most tangible qualities of the communion elements. Or, again, Mr. V. is "held together" momentarily by the concrete devices of reading an atlas, using a hymnal, underlining short phrases in the creed. (Perhaps this kind of forcible contraction of meaning is most difficult for the religious worker when dealing with "holy" things. It has relieved some theologically trained student minds at this point to recall the stark realism of the doctrine of the incarnation, and the unwavering Judeo-Christian insistence on the meaningfulness of history.)

A related characteristic of the more primitive modes of psychological functioning is found in the importance of movement and function. The detached, abstractive quality of mature thinking is missing. The person is in the midst of that which he perceives. Items are not easily abstracted from the total field of perception. The whole configuration is received as a whole, and, in its emotional valence, therefore, motion and kinesthetic sensations are basic. Communication must adopt the syntax of action if it is to be heard. Thus, with Mrs. S., the closing of the Bible "seals off" the ruminations for the moment; the ward activity provides her with kinesthetic acquaintance with the new place. Again, with Mr. V., his terribly disruptive grandiosity is countered by the chaplain's acted-out refusal to permit superiority of position.[3]

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[2] Heinz Werner, *op. cit.* This volume is a most rewarding one for the pastor who would discover the data of developmental psychology. The author, in an introductory chapter, differentiates the unique approach of developmental psychology. By the use of comparative material drawn from study of child behavior, cultural primitives, and the "pathological primitives" of psychosis he studies such critical processes as time, space perception, magic, movement, etc. Cf. Anton Boisen, "Form and Content of Schizophrenic Thinking," *Psychiatry,* V (1942), 23-33.

[3] Cf. Thomas Klink, "Group Movement in the Ward Worship Service," *Journal of Pastoral Care,* X (1956), 177-181.

Although only obliquely illustrated in the notes on Mr. V., the acutely disturbed patient demands that the chaplain forsake his usual privileged detachment from the hospital's responsibility for custody. There are a few rare occasions when it appears valuable for the chaplain to accept the communication of a patient "in confidence" from other members of the staff. It has been this writer's experience that occasions warranting such "confessional" handling are spectacularly rare. I have come to feel that the patient who attempts to place the chaplain in a position of strict confidence is almost invariably seeking, out of deep characterological needs, to isolate the chaplain from his position as the pastoral member of a therapeutic *team*—to the equal detriment of the patient's welfare, the chaplain's position, and the team's function. When dealing with the acutely disturbed patient the very intimacy of the intense experience often has tempted this writer to clothe the episode with a kind of implied confidentiality. However, experience has proved the profoundly reassuring effect of being able not only to contain the patient's anxiety with one's pastoral skills but also to continue such a reality-focusing ministry through the persons of aides and nurses as well as locks and other security devices. Thus, with Mr. V., his failing controls were contained by the interpersonal devices of the chaplain, but this containment was bequeathed to the ward personnel and a full report was given to the ward physician.

A final comment needs to be made about the place of religious symbolism in the metaphoric communication with the deeply disturbed. The metaphor is a basic device of any communication in depth. By metaphor I mean any story, incident, object, allusion, mutually recalled or experienced, whose communicative load is enriched by mutually apprehended extra meanings. The truth conveyed by a metaphor cannot be reduced to an easy analysis of the details. It speaks syncretically (as-a-whole) and thus speaks at the level of functioning characteristic not only of acute disturbance but of creative insight as well.[4] The pastor is long trained in the ability to use the metaphors of the faith—from the Bible and from the liturgy. In dealing with acute disturbance the chaplain's fluency of using the language of metaphor is put to a crucial test. I would offer a useful "rule of thumb": In acute disturbance religious metaphors are most meaningful when they support the patient's awareness of a reality of events independent of his or her concerns. Such metaphors need not be religious; they may refer to the implications of some immediate experience. Thus, the parable of the Prodigal Son with Mr. V. and the experience of kneeling, tasting with Miss T. A more general description of the way in which cultural metaphors express but "bind" deep and otherwise disturbing emotions is to be found in Theodore Reik's *Studies in Ritual*.[5]

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[4] Frieda Fromm-Reichman, "Remarks on the Philosophy of Mental Disorder," *Psychiatry*, IX, 292-309.

[5] Norton, New York, 1931.

Summary

In this paper three descriptions of a chaplain's contacts with acutely disturbed patients have been offered. The discussion of the chaplain's function in these emergency situations pointed to several aspects: the threat to fragile adjustment of any such open situation as a pastoral visit; the importance of understanding such acute disturbances as regression to more primitive levels of mental functioning. Such functional understanding of the regression of disturbance contrasts with an ideational-affective understanding. References were made to more complete descriptions of such earlier levels of genetic development in the literature of developmental psychology. Particular attention was called to the diffuse quality of perception and the undifferentiated nature of emotional response, the importance of restricted concrete experiences, and the relationship of such concretism to a syncretic mode of perception. A specific practical suggestion pointed to the importance of supporting the patient's awareness of fluctuating modes of functioning. A final note draws attention to the importance of metaphor in communication with the disturbed.

This paper is offered with the hope that it may stimulate other pastoral workers to communicate their own contacts with acute disturbance.

REDEMPTION THROUGH PUNISHMENT

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In these days of "permissiveness," when we are all advised to show attitudes which are "non-judgmental" and "non-punitive," Christians, like others, are frequently embarrassed at the continuing social fact of punishments. These of course are on occasion meted out by the powers that be in every social group, by judges, generals, bishops, and, even if they do not like to say so, by both teachers and parents.

Part of the embarrassment springs from the inconclusive discussions on this matter that have been going on for centuries. Everybody now agrees that there cannot be those two hundred or so capital offenses on the books which in the early nineteenth century faced the humanitarian conscience, but there is no great agreement whether there should be capital punishment. An older controversy, going back at least to Johannes Weyer in 1580, whether psychological illnesses can be crimes, continues to confuse both lawyers and doctors and everyone else. And the problem of the purpose of punishment—is it retributive or reformative, or both, perhaps along with plans to deter others— this problem remains obscure in theory and troublesome in practice, nor is the point clarified by changing the words about it to "therapeutic" and "punitive." Is punishment any good? Can good come from punishing evil? These seem to be the prominent and permanent questions in the ethics of punishment.

Christians, unlike others, however, are the more embarrassed, for their world view includes the fact of punishment as an inextricable element. To the Christian conscience, offenses do not appear only on the social and personal levels as crimes and vices; they have also a religious dimension as sins, which sometimes modifies and corrects part of the social evaluations, but always where it operates adds a sanction of ultimate import. To the Christian faith—even if under the Reformers' influence it dispenses with Purgatory, and under the influence of nineteenth-century Liberalism it dispenses with Hell, and under humanitarian concerns it pays no attention to Heaven—nevertheless, however much rewards and punishments are given second place or no place, to the Christian faith

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there remains the punishment of Christ, His execution, the Cross. Can redemption be wrought in a man by other men inflicting retributions and corrections upon him? How is such punishment related to the Cross? These seem to be the basic religious questions in this sphere.

I

First, we must ask, what precisely is punishment? And, the component questions, how does it relate itself in the social dimension to crime, in the personal dimension to the vice which corrodes character, and in the spiritual dimension to sin against God.

One can define crime as an act forbidden by the legal code, or an antisocial act. But many antisocial acts, such as malicious gossip, are not illegal, and many laws are dead letters. A basic way of defining wrongdoing, attending to the live letter of the law, is to see it as a social interaction, i.e., to see it in terms of the punishment it is held to merit. Thus, a crime is "an act punishable by law," the dictionary reminds us. A sociologist puts it, "In all societies of our culture, acts are committed which arouse censure severe enough to take the form of punishment by the government. Such acts are crimes, not because of their inherent nature, but because of their ability to arouse resentment and to stimulate repressive measures. From time to time the forms of crime change, but its essence remains unchanged" (E. H. Sutherland and C. E. Gehlke, in *Recent Social Trends*). In like manner, the essence of moral evil may be said to be what is contrary to right reason, what falls short of true human nature, or what disrupts love. Basically it may be said to be the corruption of character that ensues upon some acts. A murder produces not only a victim but also a murderer. The lie makes a liar. A drunkard comes to a drunkard's grave. The Pharisees, says the terrible irony of the Gospels, "they have their reward." In their pride they have arrived, they are already a success and therefore without hope, stewed in their own juice. The wicked is trapped in the work of his own hands. In this practical, empirical, experiential way of thinking, we can also see the meaning of the talk in the New Testament of rewards and punishments, an element inextricable from the earliest strata of teachings coming from the Dominical sayings themselves, and yet an element offensive to those humanitarian minds which hold love to be but sweetness and light, a sweetness that never burns and a light that casts no shadow. "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels" (Mt. 25:45), where the worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched (Mk 9:44), where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth (Mt. 8:12; 13:42; 22:13; 24:51; 25:30)—such sayings define sin as that which merits Divine punishment.

We need not at this moment try to answer the question whether the experience men have of inflicting punishment is rightly attributed to Diety, nor what eternal meaning there is in the earthly metaphors of fire and

worms and deportation to unhealthy crimes, except to note with St. Catherine of Genoa that the fire of hell is simply the light of God as it is experienced by those who reject it. Instead we may consider the differentiations of crime, vice, and sin, and then come back to their common basis as punishable acts.

It might seem that crime, moral failure, and sin differ in their fundamental principles as offenses against justice, integrity, and love, respectively, and therefore may be entirely separated or even must be radically opposed. Count Tolstoi supposed that to "resist not the evil one" and to "judge not that ye be not judged" meant that Christians must give up criminal courts, resistance to enemy states, and the existence of the state itself because of its use of force. This seems literalism, and a literalism about Matthew 5:39 and 7:1, in which Tolstoi overlooked the saying in Matthew 5:18 that the law even to its jot and tittle would not pass away till all be fulfilled. Less extreme and more popular moralists, such as Emil Brunner, nowadays speak of love as personal and law as impersonal, and find them radically different, so that justice is but a precondition to love, the rules within which it can operate. They never, it seems, see law as an instrument of love, the rules that genuine human concern makes. They appear to think that love of neighbor has to be of an individual face to face; they forget that love is also active good will to treat even unknown persons as persons. But love can make laws and does make laws so that persons be treated as persons, arranging the structure of common life as well as setting bounds to individual behavior. Love, it can even be said, can and does make punishment. "You should never beat your child in cold blood," George Bernard Shaw remarked. Of course one may beat the child in the heat of resentful anger rather than with the warmth of concern for him, but meanwhile we may note that the Judeo-Christian tradition sees eternal punishment as an aspect and a working-out of the Eternal Love. In the Inferno, Dante finds written on the gate of hell not only the familiar sentence, "Give up all hope ye that enter here." In faith he sees beyond hope and hopelessness to the Divine Charity itself and finds written also on the pediment of the gate:

> . . . God eternal
> wrought me: the Power, and the unsearchably
> High Wisdom, and the Primal Love supernal.

If God in His love gave man free will, and if the will is really free to depart from Love and if one is finally to turn one's back upon it, then love created the gate of hell and the possibility of hell, the possibility of final lovelessness.

What we may gather from these considerations is that crime, and moral failure and sin, while they exist as different dimensions of evil, all define themselves as meriting punishment. Man so lives with his neighbor in such shared humanity with him, in such coinherence of person with person, that the judgment of conscience grows from and contributes to the

judgments of society as they operate through courts and other agencies. And man is so deeply involved with eternal love, created by Him in His image, and destined for him in His likeness, that the refusal of love (love of neighbor, love of self, love of God) brings condemnation, it is punishment. "This is the condemnation that light is come into the world and men loved darkness rather than light . . . lest his deeds should be reproved" (John 3:18).

Punishment is then a deprivation of one's being, merited by what one is and has been, that occurs through some external agency, through someone else. Without entering deeply upon the question of what is the relationship of "I" to "me," how the self punishes the self, we may simply observe that the self that inflicts punishment is the self that rises above oneself, transcends it to judge, condemn, and punish, in this sense a *super*-ego. In such self-condemnation, there is still the otherness that occurs in the judgments of others, of society, and of Him who is called the Wholly Other. Punishment, the deprivation inflicted by some outside agency, is because of acts that arouse it to repressive measures and resentment. This may be said of a parent, a teacher, the state, the self. This may even be said of Deity: in fact we do say—in words which I am sure could be bettered—"provoking most justly thy wrath and indignation against us" (Book of Common Prayer, p. 75).

What is to be observed is that in all this punishment is defined in terms of another's reaction to our act. So we seem to go round in circles. We define crime in its essence, and hence sin and immorality, as punishable acts. Then we define punishment as the resentment and repression caused by crime, evil, sin. To punish, says the dictionary, is "to subject someone to retribution or disciplinary suffering."

II

For rational thought this is very annoying, but in human experience it is not very surprising, Obviously punishment is a very simple phenomenon, so simple that it is subtle. We live with it, we grow up with it (indeed we grow up by it), we use it, but it is so close to us and so much part of us that it seems impossible to make sense of it. On one level, in a sociological way of thinking, this is to say that its forms are of the folkways in any culture, but in essence a fact and folkway of every society, however different may be the forms in which it appears in different cultures and in different periods of history. While one may learn a great deal by comparison of different forms of the customs among different peoples, and while we may then reform our particular folkways, it remains a problem to delineate the essence of a custom that is universally human.

On another level, the theological, we must note that here theology confronts the same supra-rational matters which it calls "mysteries." The

mysteries of the Faith, it cannot too often be repeated, are not to be accounted preserves where reason may not trespass, but rather they are areas where reason does not work very completely, e.g., the problem of why there is suffering, or what love is. Mysteries disclose themselves not to intellect alone, for they are not merely intellectual puzzles, but only to appreciative acceptance, for example, how suffering accepted can be mellowing and maturing, how suffering inflicted against the recipient's will can change his will, or, again, how pain inflicted on another out of very mixed motives can direct and correct his motives; as the Psalmist puts it, how the wrath of man can turn to God's praise.

These last observations do not mean that there is nothing more to be said or that a study of this problem need be fruitless, for we can say something theologically even if definitive statements elude us. We can never completely comprehend the mysteries of religion, but we can indefinitely apprehend them. We cannot make the folkways entirely rational in fact or in theory but we can improve them in the light of reason. Nor can we fully explicate in intellectual terms the basic and common human nature they express. And in the light of faith and reason we can see how the mysteries of the Faith help us to appreciate the various aspects of punishment—in brief, how according to the Faith redemption is to be found through suffering inflicted by someone else (although the converse is true also, that this is damnation, for suffering inflicted by the Wholly Other is the regular description of Hell).

It seems to me that there are three possible ways of speaking of this, in terms of the mystery of the Cross, or of the mysteries of Hell and Purgatory, or of the mystery of our fallen but not depraved nature. It is difficult to decide among them, so let me briefly indicate all three ways in which theological mysteries cast light on social folkways.

III

One might speak of our human nature as it is and as it was meant to be, finding in that strange division the double root of punitive measures. In our existing nature the desire for retribution springs from envy of someone else's having done what we would have liked to do but did not dare. Disciplinary pains are inflicted to make someone else one's own disciple, in a broad sense to make him conform to our social self, to behave as everyone else does, or in a narrow individual sense to make him fear what we fear. The desire for retaliation, a desire for paying back in kind, springs in its deepest sense from a desire for dominion and power beyond any boundaries but only as that is barely checked by that ancient reform of an eye for an eye and a life for a life, still gradually winning its way over our destructive distorted instincts which want a life for an eye and for a life a lasting bloodfeud. "Hang him like a dog," we say of another human being in order to assert ourselves so superhuman as not to have any longer to treat the other as a human being. It would be

easy to point out the eroticism cruelty arouses and the institutionalized forms of sadism, the law's delays, the insolence of office, the arbitrary character of many penalties in response to popular and uninformed feelings and subject to the frailties and perversities of men on the bench, in the box, and on the beat. But, on the other hand, it would not be hard to point out the sense of justice that operates behind and through all this maze of technicalities, brutalities, and respectabilities. Haltingly, but definitely, men grope for justice. Men may largely have lost the likeness of the Divine Love, but they have not entirely lost the image in themselves of an eternal moral order which is the tranquility of peace. So in limited ways, in specified concrete ways, in administrable, enforceable ways, by law we demand of one another a minimum of social order and justice. This order may be seen, as St. Augustine rather too pessimistically thought, to be but honor among thieves, so that every action of society must be given its checks and balances to achieve justice. Hence justice is a Divine corrective. Or this order may be seen, as St. Thomas rather too optimistically thought, to be the earthly reflection of the order of the Divine sovereignty and a fairly good reflection without much limitation on the divine right of princes. Hence, justice is a Divine directive. Either way, the eye of faith sees through the existent law and the force that upholds it to the eternal law manifesting the Divine nature which is Love. It sees law as love working through justice in the orders of power, however partially, fragmentarily, and expectantly, expecting its fulfillment in love.

Punishments then may existentially be arbitrary, artificial copies of nature that destroy its design, or are out of date, or beside the point. Nevertheless, they point toward the essential nature of man. In essence on an individual level, punishment is the cost, the charge the self makes upon the self, for overcoming the perversities of its past and for perfecting the self for the future. On a social level, punishment is the danger attached to overstepping the bounds that make possible our common life together, that enable us to participate in the lives of others. On a Divine level, punishment in essence is the love of God calling us back to the way and setting our feet on the paths of peace.

IV

This suggests the second of the mysteries of the faith, or as some would prefer to call this topic of the doctrines of Hell and of Purgatory, a mythology that has been developed by faith. In the teaching of the Bible, Hell depicts the awesome character of freedom in human choices, and in its punishments there is depicted the nature of loveless choices: to cut oneself off from the Source and End of all love. Whether anyone will go to hell is something that literally God only knows; but we even now can know, and frequently do in some degree, what a hell this fire can be, escapable only by allowing God of His mercy and through others' mercies to reestablish relationships with us. In a similar way, we also experience

what is depicted in the doctrine of Purgatory, that vast and somewhat changing picture which the Christian ages have made to answer the problem of the everyday Christians who, it has been remarked, "are probably too good for Hell but they certainly are too bad for Heaven." It is a picture of precisely our theme: purgation through suffering. It points back to the original root meaning of the word "punishment," namely, cleansing.

In the course of the development of the picture of Purgatory two aspects appear, both coming from our experience of overcoming guilt. Actually there are three things to be considered when we are guilty of any offense against anyone: (1) the reestablishment of relations with him, (2) the recompense we owe him, and (3) the amendment in our character of the qualities that brought about the offense. The first of these is obvious and immediate, especially in the case of offenses in their spiritual dimensions, i.e., against God, whose property is always to have mercy. It does not enter into the theory of Purgatory. The other two take more time and cost us more. A time then, the time between death and the Last Judgment, has by Christian imagination been assigned for what this life cannot provide by way of space for amendment. In that period, it is said, the other two elements of overcoming guilt are worked through, the recompense and the amendment of life. These two elements are costly to us and they must be, their cost reflecting back on what otherwise might be but a glib "I'm sorry" at the time we seek to reestablish relations. The recompense is a juridical matter, a paying of debts due even if forgiven. If you had through negligence lost a friend's valued book or lied to him, and had, when you apologized, been forgiven, you would still like to replace the book or make up for and straighten out the distorted consequences of distorted fact. This is the juridical, the legal, the "punitive" aspect of the situation, an element of "satisfaction" for sin. In the late Middle Ages this aspect came to overshadow the other, giving the whole doctrine a bad reputation from which it has not recovered in Protestant thought. The deeper meaning of Purgatory is that it is a place of cleansing and curing, of amendment of character, what we may call "the therapeutic aspect." While in this life and in relation to other persons, these two aspects are diverse and separable, the one external, the other internal, even in this life, in relation to God, they are inseparable and the same. One cannot give God anything or pay back what one has embezzled, when all the beasts of the forest are His and the cattle upon a thousand hills. One can only give Him the inner will to give anything and everything and all that is His, the will and center of self, and all else beside of me and mine, "my liberty, my memory, my will and all that I have and am" (in the phrases from the prayer attributed to St. Ignatius). And this is the cleansing and curing, that the central will and purpose to dedicate self to God work its way into and throughout all of one's make-up and personality, my liberty for my future, my memory of my past, all possessions that I have gathered as expression of my personality and as extension of my selfhood, all that I am. And this is the punishment, then,

the refining fires of Purgatory, the cleaning waters, to be deprived of the ways of the old Adam to put on the New. It seems no mistake to call this punishment, as anyone will testify who has been told by his doctor to give up some cherished, if undesirable, habit, or, even more clearly, who is among the countless people who, not entirely without justification, think of psychotherapy as a kind of punishment however fashionable and expensive and voluntary it has become. It is no mistake to speak of the essential unity of the purposes of doctor and lawyer. They seem very unalike, of course, in the "non-judgmental" ways of the one profession, especially psychiatry, and in labors toward just judgments in the other, especially judges in their concern for the public peace and for vindication of the right. Yet no cure ultimately is possible apart from right relations of person with person, nor on the other hand can the right be vindicated without directing one toward, or at least giving grounds for, fullness of living. The inner recompense of amendment of life and the outer amendment of just recompense go together, require each other, and complete each other not only before God but also before one's true self.

Another element is to be noticed in the doctrine of Purgatory. While the purgation by pain is depicted as a punishment that fits the sinner, the point is rather that the sinner comes to fit himself to the punishment. Of course there in Purgatory punishment does more than fit the crime; it fits the criminal. In that entirely just realm, the purging is a retaliation of an exact sort, more than seems even pretended in earthly justice. Here "a life for a life" is a principle that is thought to work out only in death sentences, except that no one believes the two corpses make anyone alive again. And it works out in some damage cases where loss can be closely estimated and justly recovered. It appears, however, only in modified form where the scale of punishments is in accordance with the scale of crimes, the graver being punished more severely. "But their basis and, consequently, the apex of this ladder remains undefined, and therefore the punishments may be inhumanly cruel or extremely mild," as Soloviev remarks. In Purgatory, however, that ladder stretching from earth to heaven, the punishments are exact. Whether in Hell or Purgatory, you get what you choose. "If you really insist on having your own way, you will get it: Hell is the enjoyment of your own way forever. If you really want God's way for you, you will get it in Heaven and the pains of Purgatory will not deter you, they will be welcome toward that end" (Sayers, *Inferno,* p. 16). The punishment fits not only the crime, but fits the criminal in his very self. The fact that the punishment is known to be just offers no satisfaction in Hell, however, another entirely just realm, anymore than often it pleases us on earth who have to be reminded: "What glory is it if, when ye be buffeted for your faults, ye take it patiently?" (I Peter, 2:20).

What makes the difference between Hell and Purgatory is not the justice of the punishment, but the spirit in which it is taken, not the

punishment to fit the crime but the criminal fitting himself to the punishment. Dorothy Sayers in her comments on the Divine Comedy (II, 15) wisely remarks: "If a man is convinced of his guilt . . . punishment of whatever kind is remedial, since it lies with him to make it so; if he is not so convinced, then all punishment, however enlightened, remains merely vindicative." This acceptance of the guilt, what is called "penitence," turns the retributive suffering inflicted into disciplinary catharsis of the self.

It is in this vein that the Petrine Epistle then goes on to point beyond just and unjust suffering to a religious dimension of what is unjustly inflicted, "if when ye do well and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God." This saying, which seems to counsel masochism, really involves two deep and covered insights into punishment that make it social and spiritual in a way that masochism never is. The one is that punishment, which in this world is always at least somewhat unjust, can be accepted vicariously, on someone else's behalf, as a part of one's participation in the lives of countless others. The more there comes to be known of environmental influences and of psychological compulsions, the less margin of free will there seems to be and the less place therefore for any just punishment. There is, however, a wide margin of freedom in taking the unjust punishment. If in justice one often should spank the parent and not the child, the child is still free to take the punishment his parent deserves. "To take the rap" for someone else, friend, partner, parent, or greatgrandparent, can make one cynical and sour, or it can enlarge the sense of brotherhood and deepen the nobility of the self. What enables one to take it the latter way we must see in a moment, but meanwhile we can note that to go along with Christ in bearing the sins of the world is not in itself destructive of the self.

But really "to take the rap" is to take it inwardly; this is the second covered insight which may be gained. One must will to do what is required; one must will to suffer what is inflicted. This fitting oneself to the punishment, this loving to suffer some human injustice, takes a critical view of what would be just punishment, and goes on to the eternal meaning of justice itself where before God and before one's true self one wants to use the means at hand, what life provides, to make the amendment of recompense and to make the recompense of amendment. It is in this sense that Christ Who was put to death says, "I have power to lay down my life and to take it again."

V

This brings us to the third mystery of the Faith, the mystery of the Cross. The question in penology, as in theology, is how one can come to these insights, how this conversion is brought about, this acceptance of guilt and all it entails. The mode and the meaning of it seem to be everywhere the same, in prison, in schools, in families, in the confessional and

in pastoral counseling, in psychotherapy, and in exchanges between friends and among acquaintances. The mode and meaning are the same, although the methods differ, i.e., someone not involved in the guilt so identifies himself with the guilty that the offender can be identified with the good. The psychotherapist accepts the person of the patient, entering into the secret chambers of his heart where there is compounded circumstance and purpose, desires and will, hidden shame and proud boastfulness. Without becoming accessory after the fact by conniving and condoning, the therapist "takes" the secret shame and the defensive pride in order to penetrate to the real self as it is given to be—and all this as it were from the inside. The confessor in a different setting extends the blessing to the penitent; he speaks of the passion of Christ as the Church which he represents knows it and as it works itself out for the penitent, not only in the prayers of the saints, but in the good the penitent has done and the evil he has endured; above all, the priest gives the penitent all his attention as judge, teacher, spiritual father, and physician of souls. In both these instances, it is to be noticed, the guiltless (guiltless, i.e., in these particulars) and in one sense the offended (in so far as the psychiatrist stands for society, inasmuch as the priest stands for the Church) each identifies himself with the one who is guilty. It is this empathetic identification of the offended and guiltless with the guilty offender which enables the offender to take the punishment and to turn retributive suffering into remedial catharsis. St. Paul speaks of the ultimate spiritual meaning of this when he says "Christ was made sin for us." The Divine Victim of crime and sin makes Himself one with those who thereby reject Him, in order that they may accept Him. If we may word it this way, the Divine Criminal upon the Cross learns guilt from the inside, the Judge becomes the condemned, the true Physician dies so that we may enter into His creative power of goodness, justice, salvation.

There are many theories about the Atonement which follow up the metaphors applied to it, acquittals and satisfactions from courts of law, ransoms from kidnapping and slave-markets, medicines from the sickbed, food from family life, teaching of word and example from school life. The point of all of these is atonement, literally in its derivation, "making at one." And the manner of this "making at one" on the Cross is more than that "making at one" when the Word became flesh and dwelt among us. For this is that last full measure of His dwelling among us, sinless, to know sin; guiltless, to know the gallows; just, to know punishment. This is Love: The Omnipotent became impotent, that man might come to himself and be capable of life with others in God.

Purgation through suffering, accepting punishment, taking what is inflicted, is not the only way of redemption, but it is the way much of the time for most of us.

YOUTH IN OUR CHANGING CULTURE

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It is a difficult and complex world for all of us, but especially for those coming into maturity in change so rapid that there seems to be little that is sure or stable. Yet we tend to blame youth for their troubles which we have created or do not understand.

What is "this change"? It is, basically, related to our social evolution from an agricultural to an industrial economy, from an authoritarian to a democratic concept of authority, from a provincial to a national and increasingly international society, from stability to dynamic fluidity. The individual grows and forms in a greatly expanded world; personal contacts have become less important determinants than impersonal institutions. The family's functions are changing, the individual's roles are no longer predetermined and clear, new values come with new authorities, and a changed and more subtle psychological climate surrounds youth. Stability, surely a human need, is decreasingly provided by social structures and "externals," and has to be "built in," largely by the individual himself. This is so difficult without attendant information, skills, and understanding, that it is not surprising that many people frantically seek "sureness" in the conformity of the group. It is our generation's task, in the institutions of family, church, education, community, to provide opportunities for this internal security essential in a dynamic age.

Our Changing Society

Many insist that the American family is degenerating, but it is more accurate to say that it is changing. We recognize various distinct types in our heritage, among them the New England Puritan, the Southern aristocrat, the Quaker, the Western pioneer. Further, there are many regional, environmental, and class variations today.

Some say that in our generation there has been as much social move-

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ment as in all our previous history—and that "we haven't seen anything yet!" Changed tools and ways of life always bring changed social relationships, and change in any factor of a culture affects the total culture. It is pertinent, then, to ask what is happening, why, and with what results —and even what kind of great-grandparents we shall be.

The Changing Family

Social man has evolved from a rural agricultural or craft "subsistence economy" through an early "production economy of scarcity" to a later industrial "economy of consumption and abundance." The family has accordingly changed from a "patriarchal" to a "nuclear, conjugal, or companionship" unit. The early family, composed of many members, had the bond of land or craft, symbolized its perpetuity by the paternal name, and consciously preserved its stability—for instance, by arranged marriages. Today's family is smaller, more mobile, has a relatively unstable marriage bond, means less to the individual, and makes fewer demands on him. Social security—the care of orphans, the handicapped, the aged—which formerly lay entirely within the family, now rests in governmental, professional, and voluntary institutions.

The individual's "place" in the family is increasingly unclear. The former hierarchical authority pattern and clarity of leading and supporting, usually determined by age and sex, have given way to vaguer "shared responsibility" and "democratic equality." We have to consider what "equality," or even a measure of equality, means in terms of age and sex roles to the growing child. It means that one need not "wait" to be allowed to do adult things. "Boy's work" has become "girl's work," and vice versa. Girls drive cars and cut grass, boys wash dishes and vacuum the rug. Young people think and act within greatly enlarged limits, some of them seeing no limits at all. Whether these expanded areas are seen as "privilege," "right," or "duty" is not the question.

We have, further, both "lengthened" and "shortened" childhood. Extended education postpones adult life to the late teens and early twenties, with relatively few boys and girls doing the work of adults at fifteen and sixteen. But children are encouraged in our families, schools, and communities to early autonomy. When is one a child and when a grown-up? More importantly, when is one a *man* or *woman?* At one time a girl put up her hair and a boy graduated to long trousers—the closest our culture has come to public "initiation rites." Today the driver's license, and perhaps the legal right to drink, are important personal milestones, but they relate more to what society *permits* than what it *expects* in terms of adult behavior. They lack, too, the public spotlight for a modern equivalent of formal induction into the adult councils of the village or tribe. Again, such milestones only recognize one as "old enough" but not as a man or woman. Boys and girls are delighted to be allowed to drive, but they often wish people would listen to their ideas, too. They *feel* responsible

and adult, whether they fully are or not, and resent not being approached as such. If status is not clear, one has to prove status. Is there not a a connection here with a great increase in drinking and smoking among adolescents? And much of this proof comes through sexual experience, for this is a short cut to adult manhood and womanhood. Those young people who most need to be recognized as adult, by themselves as well as by society, are almost certain to seek short cuts.

The older family system, where children shared the work world with their parents, sons aspired to be like their fathers and daughters like their mothers, has changed to one where children are expected to be different from, often better than, their parents. Much of our "education" is dedicated to this aim. Clearly the early family generally afforded more emotional security than the family of today, if security is seen as the corollary of interdependence, insecurity of independence. But this type of family had to give way because it was geared to geographical and social stability, to static tradition, whereas modern life demands change and mobility. The cost of greater freedom and mobility is role diffusion beyond that of age and sex, involving career, class, and values. In this stage of social life, man seems to "miss" the clearly printed directions and seeks rather desperately to know himself. He has reached for freedom, but in achieving some measure of its attendant opportunity he has also found confusion. It is difficult not to *know* who you are—and to have to *make* one's self a reality.

Have we considered the psychological impact of our insistent question to young people—"What are you going to be?" A few astute young people are asking back, "What is life going to permit me to be?" They know that they have neither the certainty of no choice nor the freedom to make their own choices. Does the human being need role clarity? Possibly not, in the older terms of having things staked out for him at birth, but he does need "clues" of some kind.

Whatever change the family has experienced, some functions remain and are likely to persist. The family is a biological and economic living unit, primary in its emotional effect and in the formation and support of values. While many families today—the ones social welfare comes to know best—are failing in this fundamental responsibility, it seems that many others are succeeding as few early families could. They are consciously concentrating on the few functions inherent to healthy family life in any place or time. Found in all areas and classes of America today, they are nurturing children and youth of marvelous health and maturity. The parents believe in "family," but they also believe in their children's individual personalities and in the future. They help their children to attain the knowledge, experiences, and attitudes needed in modern life—particularly personal skills and respect for others. These parents are themselves relatively secure. Their children confront the same complexities as others, but they have within themselves the ability to inquire,

experiment, decide, and act with intelligence and humility. They have a sensitivity to people and to situations, based on strong and conscious principles. They have "values," but these are functional to the times.

New Authorities and Values

Value shifts always follow function shifts. According to David Reisman's descriptive character types, the tradition-directed would feel "shame" or "pride," the inner-directed "guilt" or "righteousness," the other-directed "anxiety" or "identity," as he responded to social interaction. In our increasingly other-directed society youth in particular do not value doing what the family expects or even what their consciences tell them as much as what their peers expect or what life demands. Much of one's life now takes place outside the home. A person's *worth* is measured by society in terms of his relationship to his enlarged world rather than to his family. In short, in terms of operation under new authorities, man "succeeds" or "fails."

Concepts of individual and social responsibility shift with the locus of authority. If, for instance, a young man's life is not wholly determined by his family, what is his responsibility to them? We can no longer clearly define an individual's responsibility to ill, handicapped, or indigent relatives.

> One young man, whose father is mentally ill, the mother's "work" necessarily the care of this "patient," is the oldest of four children. At one time he would have "sacrificed" for the family—but in a time and community where he would have had sustaining social supports. He is, actually, going to college to equip himself for a career in teaching or social work, feeling somewhat guilty about his family on relief, but more concerned about his future than about his responsibility to them. The boy's peers—the only community he has—constantly tell him to see to his own life and warn him against "ruining" himself for a family that is society's and not a son's concern.

The social supports of today, then, in terms of the success imperative so pointed in American culture, would sustain only a person's intelligence and courage pursuant to his own future.

There are, then, new authorities. Parents, religious leaders, even teachers, are increasingly secondary to the mandates of the current success imperative. Modern life gives most of us a terrifying and inconsistent combination of free choice and rigid patterns. An individual seems forced to take matters into his own hands but also seems caught in the intricate meshes of highly specified routes to this college or that job.

Youth is pushed to initial decision, but is heavily circumscribed by social controls that take over his destiny. These new authorities are "real" in their impact, but they are also vague and blurred. They are rarely individuals, such as a father or teacher, but "the gang," "the world

of work," "what a fellow has to do to get ahead," in vast bureaucracies. Youth know that reality lies all around them, but they find it difficult to grasp, understand, or experience.

The "Last Leisure Class"

It is ironic that the more educators try to "make school real," equating it with life as against preparation for life, the more youth seem to be insulated from reality. They no longer share their parents' work worlds, and because their training is lengthened, formalized, and institutionalized, few real concerns of daily living demand their thought and energy. Responsible and productive work is increasingly denied youth, whether related to "family chores" or to "work for money," and *this in a work-oriented society!* Children are, as Dorothy Barclay recently wrote,[1] "the last leisure class," often bored, sometimes desperate in their search for rigorous and responsible activity. How many community centers *use* the creative imagination and organizing ability of youth?[2] It is no wonder teen-agers have created their own "never-never land" from which they exclude adults as they themselves have been excluded. We are inconsistent in our general training for responsibility and work competence and our denial of their use to those ready for them.

The concepts and structure of democracy, so precious to us, cause confusion because we have not really clarified the meaning of authority in a democracy, certainly not with respect to family, school, or community center, where immature citizens are being guided toward adult life. Authority resides in each person, even in each child, and is also "built" or "made" by the entire group. "Set rules" are not compatible to the democratic personality—unless there has been participation in forming them. Democratic youth feel this just as much as democratic adults, understanding pretty well that law in America may not have been made with their help but nevertheless made democratically. Within institutions, however, adult-made rules handed out to youth, at one time compelling authorities, are increasingly useless—because they are not accepted.

Social history is a record of man's fight against exploitation, from governmental levels to the family, the refusal to permit unfair use of the human being. As exploitation has been routed, however, manipulation has taken its place. Manipulation is not new, but it has new dimensions in the democratic face value of letting others think they have made the decisions—the psychological mechanisms pertinent to persuasion. In a culture which values free choice this is a further frustration. In trying to understand youth, we should recognize both their search for autonomy and their frustrations in not finding it.

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[1] "Jobs for the 'Last Leisure Class,'" *New York Times Magazine,* April 14, 1957.
[2] Editor's Note: See "Public Welfare in Wisconsin," Washington; Children's Bureau, 1957, pp. 9-18.

Today's Psychological Climate

This is the Age of Freud. Young people, nurtured on mass media, have discovered that everything is mother's fault. This was hard on mother until she learned she could blame it all on *her* mother. We have deepened understanding of the growth and development of the human being, of the interrelationship of physical, mental, and emotional "selves," but we do not know what this means in terms of moral or legal responsibility.[3] When is an individual "accountable" for his actions?

It is also an age in which many homes are "broken"—and some others ought to be. Untold numbers of families are "broken" psychologically, and as many as one out of four end in divorce. There is an increase of remarriage, on a statistical average, and this involves an increasing number of couples with children. Today at least one out of twenty-five American children under eighteen is seriously affected by divorce. Court decisions try to give first priority to the welfare of children, but to what extent can they succeed when they have to fix "legal blame" and when parents often use the children as tools of battle? A child will be "uprooted" by this experience, and we can only try to help him be the kind of person that can grow elsewhere.

Social mobility has many dimensions, and one of them is added by the automobile. "Get away from home" is the implication, and the automobile is increasingly attractive and available to youth. It is no longer just a tool of transportation but, increasingly, a status-conferring object, probably more important to the young people of today than the appearance of the home.

We follow the automobile naturally to the subject of sex. A European visitor concluded that 90 per cent of sex in American takes place in cars—with drastic effects on attitudes toward sex. This may actually be true if we refer to the sex experiences of adolescent youth. Another visitor commented that no culture in the world so stimulates while it also condemns sex. This is true and illogical. There is no trend toward diminished stimulation—quite the reverse. Young people of today are caught firmly between what society at once encourages and disapproves.

The current vogue of "going steady"—"premarital monogamy," as President Cole of Amherst[4] put it—is an effort to ride both horns of the dilemma. The morality of going steady may be a matter of "opinion," but there is increasing evidence that this practice robs youth of important varied interpersonal experience and that it encourages too-early marriage. Certainly earlier marriage is with us, and statistically these marriages have less survival value than later ones. Further, there is a great in-

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[3] Meyer Levin's *Compulsion* dramatically presents this problem.

[4] *Harper's Magazine,* March 1957.

crease in premarital pregnancy—once a college problem, now a high-school and junior-high-school concern.[5]

In the last ten years there has been a 400-per-cent increase in unwed mothers between fifteen and seventeen. One out of four is under eighteen. Even if their own mothers help them to keep their babies, American society does not permit these unwed girls such a solution without severe emotional cost to themselves and their children. The psychological trauma of the entire experience is not one easily dismissed—or eliminated even by skilled guidance.

> One young man of eighteen sagely commented, "Society is nuts! They make you take driving courses so there won't be so many accidents, but they won't help you with your sex life. And sex means *real* trouble—not just a cracked-up car!" Another said, "Everyone says sex is natural and good, and it is, but then acts as if it is bad. Something's wrong somewhere."

We know "something is wrong," but have not even come to open and objective analysis and discussion.

Those of us who experienced the Depression find it difficult to understand the values of youth who have known nothing but relative plenty. What does our present economy of abundance mean as regards life values? Does it not mean that we have to shift from laws and attitudes tuned to locks, personal property, and scarcity to those that make it possible for all to enjoy comfortable lives? We are moving into a future of plenty, where "things" will really be cheap. Does this mean that we finally have conditions conducive to placing more value on human elements than material ones? Callous waste and destruction are costly and unintelligent, but youth may be more "moral" than adults in treating material possessions lightly. Possessions are not the "good life," but only among the various means to a good life. "Mom," I once heard a girl say, "the dress isn't important—*I* am."

Prosperity may be one of many factors contributing to the group nature of young people's activities. Many children don't have to do family chores or work after school, and can afford carfare, spending money, and all the appurtenances of being a member of a club, gang, or clique. Few have the experience of privacy. Most are unhappy alone, and escape into restless activity with others. This may mean they are happier but also that they are denied thought and creativity that come from aloneness. It is not that they cannot think and wonder, but that they do not permit themselves the time or opportunity to do so. They are no different from adults here, but late adolescence seems to be one of the appropriate life spots for philosophic introspection—for self-discovery. Are we, in our guidance of youth, consciously providing opportunity for this experience?

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[5] It was unofficially reported, for instance, that a large metropolitan junior high school had 240 pregnancies in one year.

We are pursuing knowledge of the individual—certainly not in self-knowledge—but most notably through tests of intelligence, achievement, personality, vocational preference, psychological aptitude, and so on. The human being becomes a pattern of holes punched in an I.B.M. card which, if routed to the correct channel by the right date, enables him to move on greased skids to this college or that job. Useful, yes, if tempered with wisdom, but dangerous and defeating in much actual practice—especially when it all takes place against the subject's will, without his understanding, and with little interpretation to him. There is a difference between the boy who discovers with joy that he has an aptitude for science and therefore enters the field with some security, and another who shrugs his shoulders, saying, "If it shows I'm no good, I don't see any point in trying." It is perhaps worst of all for the great number who show no particular strengths—in an age which demands outstanding proficiency "if one is really going to get anywhere." Have we tried to understand the pressures on youth in our testing program?

Perhaps our age is one which spells the end of adventure. Young people feel hemmed in, having grown up with harnesses, play pens, enclosed back yards, walled school yards, supervised recreation, and standardized and homogenized education. Largely gone are the woods, meadows, and streams for intensive free exploration; in their place have come "educational" and organized nature walks in the parks, trees and flowers neatly labeled. Rabbits are in the zoo, fish are in the home aquarium, horses are on television. A boy can't become absorbed in building a crystal radio set, for several sets in the house work far better. One can demonstrate the jet principle with a balloon or carbon dioxide capsule, but the real thing is too expensive and complicated for the children's world of discovery and invention. Adventure today means years of rigorous training and then a job in expensive subsidized laboratories. The average person is encouraged only to become an *operator* of things made and invented by others.

The Task of Social Welfare

Awareness of the social and emotional confusions is necessary to understand the problems of youth and their solutions. The lack of role clarity, the rootlessness of family and community life, the new and unclear authorities and values, the inconsistency of freedom and rigidity, the changing climate of psychological and social life make up our world. Many youth, defeated from the start, will continue to concern social workers. Many others at best will settle for the chromium-plated "pretty good life." In it they will know some comfort, security, and success, but will not grapple with the concerns nor make the commitments that push social men into something better.

The most able youth, however, the best nourished, are already demon-

strating a new maturity, to which most of us should bow in awed respect. They will raise their children with more understanding guidance, making the limits clearer; they will demonstrate more affection. They are already erasing the boundaries of race, religion, and geography that have distorted our attitudes and actions. Understanding bureaucracies, they will work with them, through them, and beyond them. Knowing "education" is something better than they experienced, they will try to see that their children get it. There is so much to *know,* to *learn to do,* to come to *feel* and *understand.* It is probable they will push open new areas of adventure, not only in the nucleus of the atom or in cosmic space, but also in human society—which needs all the intelligence, precision, and creative imagination man has. In hoping to do all this they cry to be permitted significant participation in home, community, and world.

As we work with the many already defeated boys and girls, let us not forget those with health and strength. Can social workers, along with others connected with youth, help more of our boys and girls to be in this healthy group? As young people are exposed to more people and situations outside the home—and therefore more difficult to understand or trust—can we make both a more challenging and trustworthy environment for their growth to supply the elements of trust, to permit more real freedom but also to give "clearer signs" and more protective devices? We need, in short, a scientific as well as a personal sensitivity to the *human* element of modern industrial society.

Social welfare, like medicine, should see more to prevention than to cure. This means more work with parents—do they know how to handle family finance, how do they use their leisure time, and in what ways do they nourish family togetherness? It means dealing with people and institutions affecting youth—how are children "treated" in schools, hospitals, community centers? It means working for the *conditions* of healthy living—in housing, medicine, recreation, and work. It particularly means helping to modernize and humanize "law," as in definitions of sex crime, in the purposes of a "reform school," or in the use of foster homes. Children belong to themselves, to all society, and to the future. We of the older generation need both to free and to guide them in this their great adventure.

RELIGION AND MEDICATION: A SOLILOQUY

THE VENERABLE JOHN MELVILLE BURGESS

Archdeacon of the Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts

It was about fifteen years ago that I was called one evening to take a young boy to the hospital. He was in obvious distress and had such an appearance of grave illness that his family was frightened into complete inability to function at all. It was my job to transport him to the General Hospital, enter him through the Emergency Ward and discuss the case with the attending doctors. It was quickly learned that he had a ruptured appendix. The surgeon, whom I recognized as one of the top men of the University of Cincinnati medical staff, explained to me the extent of the infection and stated flatly that the boy had not a chance in a million to recover. He did add that there was a new drug now being used somewhat experimentally, called penicillin, that they would try in this case. He could predict nothing, however, and suggested that a member of the family remain at the hospital to see how things turned out. The family was large and poor. It was necessary that the father get a few hours of sleep before going to work in the morning. The mother had come with a small baby in her arms and had left ten children at home. It was obvious what my job was. We prayed together and I sent them home and took my station at the bedside.

Though I had been a patient in a hospital myself some years before, I had never spent such a night while being well. We were in a typical ward of a City Hospital—about twenty-four beds, with no privacy except screens around two or three of the more seriously ill patients. The room was dark except for stray lights from the hall that made eerie shadows on the ceiling. Periodically a nurse or aide would come to check the situation, or to respond to a sudden call for assistance.

As the evening wore on, almost another kind of world sprang into being. As the patients settled down to the darkness of the night there arose moans of distress, seemingly uttered just for emotional relief. There were groans of agony, and sudden screams of pain. There was the quiet whimpering, muffled by bed coverings, of men almost ashamed of their tears. There was cursing; incessant "Lord, have mercies"; cries of rage that the nurse or doctor did not come running. There were fears of being neglected; the terrors of possible death. Already our recent

entry into the war was causing a shortage in hospital personnel, so I volunteered to slip away from my bedside once in a while to help with the dirty work. I saw for the first time how efficiently the nurses wrap a dead body in the bed sheets and whisk it away to the morgue and not a patient is any the wiser that their number has been diminished by one. And in the midst of this, my boy, in his delirium, began to sing what was then called "boogie-woogie." In a sense, this night in a hospital ward was not frightening or terrifying. It was mystifying. One had a chance to wonder again and again about the meaning and existence of pain, and suffering, and fear, and death. Well, after about a two months' bout, the boy recovered. He is now a senior at an eastern seminary.

Last year about this time, I was a patient in a hospital. Though the sudden attack was distressing and painful, I cannot say that I was the victim of great and overpowering agony any time during the experience. Yet as I lay in my bed at night, I recalled the former time. Things had changed. True enough, I was not in a large, rather promiscuous ward. But the room opened into a long corridor that made one aware of a community of illness. But at night there was no confusion. There was nothing of the bedlam that marked the old Cincinnati General. Yet for one who had been through the former experience, the strange quiet was almost as eerie as the City Hospital noise. Surely sickness is sickness, and pain is pain. And people who can afford, thanks to Blue Cross—Blue Shield, private quarters rather than ward service, with all their refinement, still cry in pain, curse the sudden twinges, and protest at what they imagine is carelessness or neglect. Yet why the difference in atmosphere?

Well, in the nights that followed, I discovered the secret. Around ten o'clock, just about the hour when the wounds start throbbing and we start feeling lonely, abused, and neglected, a bright, cheery nurse comes in with a tray. On it are rows of hypodermic needles and little paper cups containing capsules. The patients are invited, even urged, to take a shot to kill any possible pain and swallow a capsule to get to sleep. A successful nurse can thereby dope her entire constituency into unconsciousness and have relatively little trouble for several hours. I do not begrudge her her determined efforts to accomplish this purpose. With the hospitals as short-handed as they are, this certainly relieves many of the cares and concerns of former days. But it raises questions that we can be pardoned for asking even though answers are still far from realization.

I think of a woman in the room next to mine. I did not see her, but she sounded exactly like Mama Goldberg, and I can imagine her to be heavy-set, about fifty, and certainly Jewish. One night she started whimpering, and this pitiful sound slowly developed into an hysterical cry, "Why can't I go to sleep by mine self? I always go to bed at 10 o'clock and I sleep like a baby. Now I can't sleep except I take a damned

pill. I want to go to sleep on my own. I want to go to sleep on my own." I caught something of her spirit myself. The nurse came in to give me my shot and my pill. I told him to skip the shot. He showed me my wound and dared me to say it wouldn't hurt during the night. I told him that it smelt far worse than it hurt and that I was sure that I could "stand" it. I wasn't so sure about sleep and I persuaded him, contrary to hospital regulations, to let me keep the pill in my drawer so that, if necessary, I could take it later that night. I slept through the night and still have the pill as the souvenir of my victory.

This revolt on the part of the Jewish woman and myself raises questions. What is religion's answer *today* to problems of pain and unwonted distress? Theologians have been dealing with these matters in every age, finding answers in God's will for and God's will against, in character development and character destruction, in God's final glory and in God's judgment and condemnation. Throughout it all the pastor has plodded his humble way. Not having a precise or satisfying solution, with sure faith he has called upon trust in God's power to bring peace to the troubled mind, healing to the pain-wracked body, and consolation to the soul in distress. The mystery of the peace of God that passes all understanding has been the pastor's standby. The ready accessibility of a tranquilizing or stupifying drug changes the situation today. We are not thinking now of the agonizing pain that must be met, as it has for generations, by dosages of morphine derivatives. We are rather considering the light and alleged harmless pills and shots that frankly produce sleep or feelings of comfort and well-being, not only in hospitals, but also more aptly to meet the conflict of the daily routine. Why try God? This is not as facetious as it sounds. Is the concern for sick bodies and troubled minds to slip away from its traditional moorings in the pastoral approach? We have, sometimes grudgingly, admitted that the mental sciences can handle a good portion of the more serious cases in this field. Are we to admit that the people themselves can look after the smaller situations when what is required is a booster shot to keep working a few hours more, a stiffen-upper to face a bad emotional situation, a momentary surcease from pain, a quieted conscience to induce sleep? We pray for "that peace which the world cannot give." The millions of dollars spent on tranquilizers say the world thinks it can do a pretty good job along this line itself. We must admit that a good deal of our liturgy for Evening Prayer has been outmoded simply by the admission into our culture of the electric light. In spite of rising crime rates, most people do not look with approaching dread upon all the perils and dangers of the night. The hospital ward need no longer be a chamber of horrors, nor need our bedrooms be packed with ghoulies and ghosties from which we implore angel guards to defend us. We can take a pill, forget about it and sleep in peace. And we are not judged to be dope addicts either. For we are assured that this medication is "not habit-forming" and we can take it in good

conscience. It is not included under drug laws, and can be taken without prescription. Why do we assert our desire to sleep, or bear pain, without external help, except that which comes from God? Why do we protest, or at least feel uneasy, at this tendency to artificial means? Some men, of course, resent the usurpation of another area of pastoral service by a new technique. All of us feel qualms upon hearing that tranquilizers are becoming standard equipment with baby-sitters who can thereby be assured of an uneventful evening with their small charges to whom they give the dosages. But even more fundamentally, we again must puzzle through the place of suffering and conflict in normal human development. I wonder if Sherwood Anderson does not hit upon a legitimate approach, if not a final answer, in his play *There Shall Be No Night.* The Finnish neurologist, Dr. Valkonen, has just been awarded the Nobel Prize in medicine. He is asked to speak to America by way of radio at the time of the presentation. Among his remarks he says:

> Science has considered disease as mechanical phenomena, to be cured by mechanical means. And we have been remarkably successful. Examine the achievements in the fight against tuberculosis—typhoid—all the ancient plagues. You will see that the number of fatalities is steadily being reduced. Then look at the degenerative diseases—insanity, which is the degeneration of the brain—and cancer, which is degeneration of the tissues. These diseases are going up, almost in the same proportion as the others are going down.
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> Degeneration! That is the most terrifying word in the human vocabulary today. And doctors are beginning to ask, "Is there not a suspicious connection between our victories and our defeats? Are we perhaps saving children from measles and mumps that they may grow up to be neurotics and end their days in a mad-house?" Perhaps without that essential experience, they go into maturity without having developed adequate defenses against life. What are these defenses?
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> St. Paul has said: "We glory in tribulation; knowing that tribulation worketh patience; and patience, experience; and experience, hope." We have been striving to eliminate tribulation, and as we have succeeded we have deprived man of his experience, and thus of his hope.
>
> We have counted too heavily upon pills and serums to protect us from our enemies, just as we count too heavily upon vast systems of concrete fortifications and big navies to guard our frontiers. Of what avail are these artificial protections if each man lacks the power of resistance within himself?
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> I am not pleading for a return of measles and mumps. I am only saying that all of us have been trying too hard to find the easy way out—when man, to *be* man, needs the experience of the hard way. "There is no coming to consciousness without pain," in the words of Dr. Jung, and Science has provided no substitute for pain.

We perhaps see here the connection between body and spirit on a deeper level. Our pastoral concern for those in physical suffering or mental

anguish not only may bring healing to body and soul *at that moment,* but may also be providing strength both to body and soul for the future perils that will take place inevitably in a person's normal experience. The elimination of struggle, making the calling upon God seemingly unnecessary, thereby distorts our growth, developing as it were, monsters: huge physically, but lacking a spiritual ingredient. This has implications not only in individual life, but in the life of a society or a nation. Dr. Valkonen, in this same play, says:

> . . . You see the spectacle of a great, brilliant nation, which has contributed perhaps more than all others to scientific progress. Today, the spiritual resistance of its people has been lowered to such an extent that they are willing to discard all their moral sense, all the essential principles of justice and civilization. They glorify a theory of government which is no more than coordinated barbarism, under the leadership of a megalomaniac who belongs in a psychopathic ward rather than a chancellery. He seeks to create a race of moral cretins whom science has rendered strong and germless in their bodies, but feeble and servile in their minds. We now know how quickly such men can be converted into brutes.

And if this could be true of Germany, certainly a nation never known for its softness, what shall we say for America? Attempts to analyze the easy breakdown of American boys who undergo Communist brainwashing makes us wonder.

In his book, *The Organization Man,* William Whyte points up the real gravity of this tendency, not only in the area of the physically sick, but in what might be called the sickness of our whole culture. For example, Mr. Whyte says, this tendency is reflected in contemporary fiction. In the old days, most novels reflected the typical American materialism by having the poor worker marry the boss's daughter. This was the inevitable destiny of any young American who was ambitious and righteous. Now it has changed. As Mr. Whyte says:

> This does not mean that our fiction has become fundamentally any less materialistic. It hasn't; it's just more hypocritical about it. Today's heroes don't lust for big riches, but they are positively greedy for the good life. The yen, furthermore, is customarily interpreted as a renunciation of materialism rather than as the embrace of it that it actually is. The usual hero of the postwar rash of "New York" novels, for example, is overweeningly spiritual on this score. After making his spurious choice between good and evil, the hero heads for the country, where, presumably, he is now to find real meaning in life. Just what this meaning will be is hard to see; in the new egalitarianism of the market place, his precipitous flight from the bitch goddess success will enable him to live a lot more comfortably than the ulcerated colleagues left behind, and in more than one sense, it's the latter who are the less materialistic. Our hero has left the battlefield where his real fight must be fought; by puttering at a country newspaper and patronizing himself

into a native, he evades any conflict, and in the process manages to live reasonably high off the hog. There's no Cadillac, but the Hillman Minx does pretty well, the chickens are stacked high in the deep freeze, and no doubt there is a hi-fi set in the stable which he and his wife have converted. All this may be very sensible, but it's mighty comfortable for a hair shirt.

It would seem to me that our pastoral job not only involves more than ever the salvation of individual souls but the very health of the nation. Again we must emphasize with Dr. Valkonen: "I am not pleading for a return of measles and mumps." And we recognize that it is going to be difficult to persuade our people we aren't doing just that. There will be those who will accuse us of loving pain for the sake of pain, of a puritanical streak that exalts suffering, of a ascetical strain that revels in discomfort. But somewhere along the line we must take a stand that it is necessary at times actually to wrestle, like Jacob, with God that He bless us, and that we wrestle with ourselves that, under God, we become masters of ourselves. It is part of our spiritual growth, that we, like the importunate widow, be made to plead for God's blessing. It is part of our spiritual growth that we feel strong enough actually to fight a battle, to bear physical pain and psychic adversity.

How we make our people understand this, I am not sure. Perhaps it starts from the presence of the Cross itself in the Christian way of life, but at some point, I suppose, there must begin some teaching and direction for our people regarding the use of tranquilizers, sleeping potions, and pain killers. This area of counseling is just as practical as having them face up to the agony of moral decision, or having them take a stand for intellectual truth and social righteousness. What can we say to a society that must be on the job and hasn't time to have a head or joint ache or its efficiency marred by insomnia, or mental depression?

But more basically, we must help them define more clearly and realistically what are the elements that must be found in the good life. Theodore Gill, writing in *The Christian Century,* makes this comment: "The Christian news has a hard time coming as *good* news to people who are not themselves torn by the rifts in the world, who are not deeply agitated with what may be wrong with them and what may be done about it, who are not somehow perplexed by what everything is about." He is talking about presenting the Christian Gospel in Thailand to rather complacent Buddhists. His statement applies to us too. But this is about where we came in. In the meantime the nurse comes tripping in, "Do you want to go to sleep? Here are a shot and a pill. Good night. See you in the morning."

ILLNESS AND RELIGION: A PHYSICIAN'S TESTIMONIAL—A NOTE

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In my daily rounds as a House Physician at Bellevue Hospital, I cannot help but feel the interrelationship between a patient's illness and his religious faith. This interrelationship is a subtle thing, but its effect upon the patient's state of well-being is not to be denied.

Here let me confess that early in our training my generation of physicians turned away from the religious aspects of life. At that time we were faced with a fascinating series of intellectual problems for which concrete answers had to be found. The mystery of human illness and disease seemed to demand a diagnosis on a factual rather than a theoretical or spiritual level. The scientific spirit engulfed the medical student. It left little, if any, time or inclination for religious contemplation.

This ignorance of the importance of religion in medicine, however, cannot remain when finally the young medical school graduate takes his place on the staff of a hospital. For, regardless of what he himself believes, he finds constant reminders of the sick person's need for God.

Bellevue Hospital, for example, has a special wing set aside for prayer. Here, side by side, are found large and beautiful chapels for those of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faith. When I first became aware of Chapel Hall, as the wing is called, I could not help but wonder how great a role it really played in the life of the patients. My answer was not long in forthcoming. I saw it first in the pain-wracked face and body of an elderly Catholic gentleman who was crippled with arthritis. To my amazement, when he left the Catholic chapel he looked as if the pain had been softened a hundredfold. Again and again thereafter I saw lessening of suffering by prayer for patients of all faiths. Also, it was not an uncommon occurrence to see a patient, who by all medical standards should have died, regain his health and leave the hospital. There was no logical explanation for these occurrences. It seemed as though a vital force transcended the vast array of medicines and medical skill. That force could only have been God. Slowly I began to understand the basic

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Jewish conviction which maintains that matter and spirit are one. I came to realize that both body and soul are God's handiwork, and that both, therefore, must be carefully and reverently tended. It is a realization such as this that tempers the inquiring scientific spirit of the young physician with a reverence and humility.

I do not profess to recommend that religion alone can obviate the pain and misery of disease. I could not call myself a physician if I did. But certainly, in facing even the minor ills of everyday living, a belief in God can do much to improve the state of a person's health. After all, in many ways health is a state of mind, and one's emotional and mental well-being is inexorably entwined with the physical processes of life. Many of my colleagues and I have come to realize that religion is a driving force that is as much a part of the treatment of an illness as any medication. Just as an injection of Salk vaccine can give protection against the virus of poliomyelitis, so can regular injections of religion, with attendance at the sanctuary and adherence to a Jewish way of life, give protection against many of the ills for which there is no vaccine or antibiotic, and give very concrete help to the physician in his own fight against disease.

There is a quotation from the Bible which should be heeded by patient and physician alike. Its wisdom can well serve as a guide for all men. It reads, "Revere the Lord and turn away from evil. It will be healing to your flesh and medicine to your bones."

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EDITORIALS

Educating for Professional Responsibility

An acute problem facing those responsible for theological education, recognized and helpfully discussed in *The Advancement of Theological Education* and again worked over at the Biennial Meeting of the American Association of Theological Schools in Boston last June, is how to use three short years most advantageously to equip the student for his task that lies ahead. How does a school "get it all in"? Truly it cannot. As in medicine and in law, the mass of information and of skill that the professional man is expected to acquire is too much for three years or, for that matter, five years.

What then gives? Abandon Greek? Forget that psychology has provided understanding of human behavior which a minister can hardly afford to ignore? What is of first importance? Stress theology? Concentrate on the application of the Gospel to burning current social issues? More Bible? A more careful appraisal of the minister's role as administrator, community leader, and pastoral counselor, and adjustment of the curriculum so that the minister is equipped for these functions?

There tends to be a schism in some schools. Until the pastoral subjects more recently added to the curriculum develop the literature available for the study of the Bible, the professors who read the Talmud may regard their brethren who teach speech as not quite their equals in the length and rigor of their preparation, while the men in Christian Education may entertain privately, or sometimes more openly, a suspicion that their brother, the medieval historian, is a dodo, an irrelevant bird in an age on the brink of catastrophe.

Of course the real issues lie deeper, in the nature of the work for which theological students are being equipped. Let us mention only in passing the pardonable tendency of the esoteric professor to train successors in his own likeness; even the dodo has a reproductive urge, and there are some young people who desire to escape the world. Let us recognize also here and there a surrender to the immediate pressures of modern culture at the sacrifice of eternal truth, the sin of excessive contemporaneity. But, deeper, there are legitimate differences in the concept of the profession and its responsibility. Even assuming that ministers should be carefully trained (which is not always granted), are we to put the ictus of that training upon "life situations," or is this an interstitial profession that demands above all else a capacity for detachment and light upon the problem which the doctor or the lawyer cannot solve because the minister sees it *sub specie aeternitatis?* If the latter, how is any such celestial view obtainable?

Or we might put the question in this way: Is the ministry like other callings in its demand for professional knowledge of a rather definite and rather large corpus of facts, for the achievement of certain skills which are by no means easy to come by, and for that steady growth in a recognized competence that results from years of full-time attention and high seriousness of industrious purpose? Or are there too many dangers in this concept of the professional? Should the theological school develop an amateur's contempt for worldly gain and position, no nicely calculated less and more, but the radical boldness of the creative artist and the serenity of the man of prayer?

Answers to questions such as these are likely to be forged chiefly in those faculties where sharp differences of purpose exist. The school which has no such tensions may think itself fortunate, but it may enjoy peace at the cost of some important dimension of professional responsibility. No editorial writer has the formula for a given school's salvation; what he may suggest, perhaps, is that every professor strive better to understand his brothers' purpose, his brothers' subject, his brothers' convictions about the ministry. "The eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee." Let every lecture in Old Testament be deepened by a concern that the truth expounded become available for the problems of our desperate time, and let every hour in church music be truly an exercise in theology. Have two world wars and a depression made no difference in the historian's treatment of the fourth century? Can ethics, or the conduct of worship, or pastoral counseling be rightly taught apart from theological perspectives that illumine every minute?

One further suggestion: Let us keep informed about the experiments akin to the case method in law and clinical medicine in which some schools are trying to bring together precept and practice. And a final question: What is *essential* in the three brief years of theological school and what

may *better* be postponed to the other years of the ministers' ongoing life-long education?

CHARLES L. TAYLOR

Social Adaptation

The article reproduced in this issue on "Youth in Our Changing Culture" expertly portrays the quandaries faced by our young people as they seek to attain a clear image of themselves in a world in which the only sure thing appears to be a continuous series of dislocations. In a society that firmly tells each young person what he may become, the feeling of freedom may often be greater than in one in which the choices are infinite. This is especially apt to be true if each choice that is made appreciably narrows the range of possibilities that remain. George Kennan once remarked that social change should never be so rapid that the experience of a father is unrelated to the problems of his son. We are perilously near that point now.

It is no use wishing we could go back to the more slowly evolving past. Nor can we hope to slow down the forward march in the fields of science and technology, in which such spectacular progress has been made in recent decades. The advances, if such they can be called, made in the manipulation of our environment only serve to spotlight the poverty of our goals and the meagerness of our inner resources. Our efforts must necessarily be centered on increasing the means of self-control and meeting the deeper spiritual needs of people, who, as Santayana once said, are rushing faster and faster in an unknown direction.

Here lies the unique opportunity of our religious groups. Whitehead has said that religion should meet change in the same spirit as does science. Dean Harrison of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has indicated how often religion has solved many basic psychological problems empirically before their reasons for existing were fully understood. The inference is strong that when science establishes valid reasons for certain types of behavior as compared with another, religion can move on to newer and more difficult problems.

The minister and the physician are gradually learning how to work together for the relief of human suffering without either weakening his own sense of position or security. But the process is not without its pitfalls. All too often the minister tends to become a rather second-rate psychiatrist or the physician becomes a naive theologian. Diffusion of roles must be carefully avoided.

Some clergymen may feel that utilizing psychiatric and psychological principles in the counseling portion of their work is a desertion of religion or an admission that religion is not adequate for the solution of all human problems. On the contrary, a proper utilization of knowledge derived

from the behavioral sciences should add just one more resource for the Church in its unremitting efforts to improve man in all his dimensions. The fact that the Church and its representatives attempt to use modern knowledge of personality development in aiding its young people to develop firm values which will guide their future conduct is an encouraging sign of the enduring vitality of religion. Doctor Cormack's article should increase our awareness of the human needs of youth just as it indicates the Church's clear opportunity.

DANA L. FARNSWORTH, M.D.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

Edited by The Rev. Rollin J. Fairbanks

Battle for the Mind: William Sargant; Doubleday, New York, 1957. 263 pp. $4.50.

The encounter, during the Korean War, of American soldiers with the brain-washing and thought-control techniques of the totalitarians has stirred this country greatly. What had happened to many Europeans and Asians, it could, unbelievable as it seemed, also happen to the United States' own flesh and blood. The confessions heard from behind the bamboo curtain and from some "turn-coats" proved it! The shock about such a realization found its reflection in a growing number of publications. From among the non-fiction literature this reviewer would mention only three books.

The first, *Brainwashing* by Edward Hunter, has been reviewed in the Spring, 1958, issue of this *Journal.* The second is Dr. Joost Meerloo's *The Rape of the Mind.* The third is the volume being reviewed here. It was written by a British physician and professor, at present the President of the Psychology Section of the Royal Society of Medicine. Dr. William Sargant has been especially interested in the "physical" aspects of psychiatric treatment, a common field in which the psychiatrist and the general physician can meet and work together. Therefore, his present book has the characteristic subtitle: "A Physiology of Conversion and Brain-Washing."

Scientifically it all began with the investigations of the Russian professor, Ivan P. Pavlov, into the higher nervous activities of dogs, and with the resulting "Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes." Pavlov's research work meant a concentration on brain physiology and on the mechanisms of the nervous system; and it was no surprise that the sensational results soon invited an extension of his investigations to another living being that shared such brain and nerve substance with the canine world, namely *Homo sapiens.* It was Pavlov himself who toward the end of his life experimentally applied his discoveries about dogs to a research in human psychology. The findings were that, when the human brain was strained beyond the limits of normal response, it too (like the brain of the canines) would usually not stand up to the situation. As does the brain of animals, so does man's brain react to severe and prolonged pressures with debilitation and final collapse.

The best way to cause such breakdown of human beings would be to work upon the emotions of a person, find his weak spots and hammer on them as hard as possible until an abnormal condition of fear, anger, or exaltation is created. If this condition is maintained long enough, the person will weaken and become increasingly open to suggestions which in normal circumstances he would have rejected. The intense stresses imposed on the brain lead to temporary collapse and stupor, in the course of which a new pattern of beliefs and behavior can be implanted in the victim's brain by forceful and repetitive indoctrination. All this has been called thought-control, brain-washing, and has hitherto been identified with the political manipulations of the modern totalitarians only.

It is the thesis of Sargant's book, however, that the foregoing phenomena are much older than the "Reds' psychiatry." The same or similar techniques are not only instrumental, he believes, for changes of political convictions and the eliciting of surprising "confessions," but they are likewise responsible for sudden, overpowering conversions of a religious nature! Sargant is also convinced that many "insights," as gained during psychoanalytical treatments, are comparable to both political and religious changes.

The author seems to assume that hard and prolonged emotional pressures on persons may trigger hitherto unidentified processes in the brain and nerve substances (perhaps a psychophysical alchemy?). These are comparable, perhaps, to processes and results as they are experienced in the new widely used biochemical treatment procedures with disturbed patients, and not unlike the physiological impact and the psychological effects of modern electric and insulin shock-treatments.

It will perhaps surprise and even shock religious leaders to learn that the principles of "brain-washing" have (intuitively and pre-scientifically) been used throughout the history of religion. The techniques of how to prepare a congregation for religious conversion experiences, of how to stimulate and carry them through, are exemplified by a long discussion of John Wesley's revivalism. To find Pavlov and his political executors as brothers in method and performance with the Inquisition of the Roman Church, the Protestant revival, with voodoo and other exotic sects, with the hierophants of the Eleusinian mysteries and the shock-treating psychiatrists of recent times—all this is, indeed, exciting and disquieting reading.

There can be no doubt that Sargant, in order to make his point and to bring home a staggering thesis, tends to exaggerate and to oversimplify. Many examples could be offered that even under extreme pressure man is not a Pavlovian automaton, a helpless, mechanistic bundle of conditioned reflexes only. Spiritual courage, faith in religious, ethical, social, or political values and ideals, loyalty to loved ones, understanding of his own motivations and of those of the enemy—all these are strong antidotes against pressures toward depersonalization. Dr. Meerloo, in his previously mentioned book, has brought all this out, and the research of this reviewer in the dark field of the Nazi concentration camps has taught him the same.

It would be unwise, however, to minimize the challenges of Sargant's book, and to find easy reassurance in the fact that we have proof and example of how men have courageously withstood brain-washing. Not many people are that spiritually resolute. Furthermore, the most recent trend in medicine toward biochemical experimentation with the mentally sick confirms that much more of man's mind may be due to physiology than psychologists and dynamic psychiatrists have assumed.

Finally, any repugnance of the Western world toward Pavlov's investigations should not allow us to overlook the availability of demonic methods to control and influence the human brain, to manipulate people. It is not so much the applicability and effectiveness of such methods that is in question, as it is the justification for their use.

The final issue is a moral one. The Western world has occasionally (and especially more recently) been out-played by the totalitarians. Treating the

"Imago Dei" as being without cardinal distinction from dogs (or sheep) is perhaps the basic element and mystery of the success of those brotherhoods which aim at robbery and exploitation of all non-brothers. If uniformity of individuals and power politics of monolithic groups is all that counts in life, then brain-washing of the human (like the canine) world is highly recommended. It is also a sad truth that the cynical manipulators of human conditions have usually a good head start before those who respect the integrity of their fellow men move into action. In order to resist the temptation, for whatver purposes it may be, to manage and rape the mind of his fellows, man needs either the strange nobility (and the readiness to accept possible ridicule and defeat) of a Don Quixote, or a firm faith and confidence in the promises of the Christian proclamation. Whether we will appeal to the dignity or the misery of man depends on our guiding beliefs and the resulting moral decisions.

E. FREDERICK PROELSS

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When Minds Go Wrong: John Mourice Grimes, M.D.; Devin-Adair, New York, 1954. 246 pp. $3.50.

The author has a definite message and a mission to deliver it. The former, as his pre-title reads, is "The Truth about Our Mentally Ill and Their Care in Mental Hospitals," the "sizzling" truth. It is an extensive indictment based upon a two-year study of mental hospitals done by the author and three other doctors for the American Medical Association, around the year 1935, as well as upon fifteen subsequent years of Dr. Grimes' employment and interest in mental hospitals.

Gross inhumanities witnessed and experienced by Clifford Beers and others are reported. That these almost universally are perpetrated by attendants is seen as resulting from (1) a carry-over of older practices from the asylum system, (2) the expectation that the attendant will enforce his authority ("if he cannot, he is worthless and he knows it"), (3) political control over state hospitals. Basically, the whole state hospital system is at fault but changes do not occur. "Pretensions" are one of the reasons. People in general pretend that patients are receiving treatment when actually few are, that treatment areas in the hospital seen by the public are characteristic of the total hospital, that, because doctors and nurses are visible, there are enough of them, that the old system is changing. Dr. Grimes would abolish the present system and replace it by a community ("village") in which relearning could take place, where the individual was respected, and where personnel are specialists (not attendants) under the doctors' supervision. The sociologist and the psychologist would also play prominent roles.

Some of the author's critical remarks are directed toward members of his own profession. The official classification or nomenclature of the American Psychiatric Association is termed "a monstrosity beyond the grasp of mortal mind"; a much simpler approach is to treat the psychosis as an attempt on the part of the patient to cope with failure. For most mental patients, he feels, their problems are of a psychological and social (or social psychological) nature and not organic as is the medical orientation. With this point of view he often finds himself at variance with other psychiatrists. These differences include treatment procedures (lobotomy and electric shock and other somatic

methods versus new experiences and reeducation), and admission and discharge practices. Overcrowding is, in part, traced to the admitting and keeping of patients who could go out.

Certainly what Dr. Grimes has to say should have a hearing (he feels his views have been suppressed and they probably have been). There is much sound sense in what he says about the social psychological base of mental illness and with which this reviewer finds himself in wholehearted agreement. It is probable that Dr. Grimes' colleagues would find it hard to work with him. As he says of himself early in the book, "In college I majored in sociology and then, in keeping with a lively sense of obligation, I chose medicine as the medium of experience for my outstanding interest." As a utopian, he is interested in change, not so much in "working with." Here may be the basic deficiency of his book. In the state hospital of tomorrow, more is needed than the getting rid of what is wrong.

None the less the job of being a prophet and of getting rid of what is wrong is not easy, as Dr. Grimes has found. Many thanks are due him for his candor, his uncommon common sense, and his determination to be heard.

JUDSON D. HOWARD

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Healing: Human and Divine: edited by Simon Doniger; Association Press, New York, 1957. 254 pp. $3.50.

This book brings together a series of articles covering a wide range of topics under the general head of "Healing," which is taken here to mean the process of being made whole. These were originally published in the periodical, *Pastoral Psychology,* over the seven years since its inception. There are articles on the relation between "Mind, Body, and Spirit," articles on "Religion and Psychiatry," articles on "Prayer," and articles on "Spiritual Healing." Even so, some of the articles included under these subheads do not fit these categories, although Earl Loomis attempts to knit them together in an introduction.

Although connected only by a common concern and a common interest in relating psychology, psychiatry, and religion, the articles are good reading by themselves even if they do strike one as being a sample of a whole meal or snatches of a conversation. In such a state they may be representative of the present state of our knowledge and hunches about healing. What is not clearly enough brought out is that these articles draw upon divergent theories of personality and differing systems of theology. Unless one allows himself to be confused or to blur distinctions, he must be prepared to shift frames of reference as he moves from one articles to the other.

PAUL B. MAVES

•

No Escape from Life: John Sutherland Bonnell; Harper, New York, 1957. 215 pp. $3.25.

One can have no quarrel with the readability and clarity of this book, nor its sharing of an abiding confidence in God's goodness and strength. There is a wealth of illustrative material from both the Bible and present-day living.

The author, in offering all these, is a master craftsman through both the written and spoken word. For the despairing and fearful there is much encouragement through suggestions and pointing to resources and means of help in time of trouble.

This reviewer, however, seriously challenges the publisher's attempt to represent this as a book by which the minister can learn to be a pastoral counselor. It is frankly dishonest advertising to state, as does the blurb on the jacket, that "Dr. Bonnell . . . one of America's most highly regarded counselors . . . shows just how thousands ('over 8000') have been helped to meet and conquer the major frustrations of mid-Twentieth-Century life." This is what the book does *not* do! It talks all around these issues. Those who know something of dealing with people who have "deep depressions" or suffer from "migraine headaches" grow cynical at the reporting of 100-per-cent cures in this volume. Not only does it make a travesty of what we mean by pastoral counseling but it also serves to add confusion to an area of the minister's work which today so badly needs light and clarification.

ERNEST E. BRUDER

•

Search for Love: Lucy Freeman; World, New York, 1957. 245 pp. $3.75

If the letters quoted by Lucy Freeman in *Search for Love* are an indication of the need of the lonely, the despairing, and the disillusioned for assurance that help *is* possible, then this book, too, should provide added assurance and practical guidance. Miss Freeman speaks with an authority born of personal experience. If she seems to impress the reader that psychoanalysis is the only way to happiness for the lonely and despairing, the disillusioned and uncertain, this again is personal conviction which results from experience.

Proceeding from the premise that the basic need of all men is the ability to accept and to give love which results in true happiness, the author quotes personal letters addressed to her, arranging them in three categories and adding her reply in each instance. The first section deals with the evidence in its many manifestations of those who have not learned to give or receive love; the second with the testimonies of those who have tried many of the short-term, capsule-form treatments; and the third with those who have tried, or are trying, or are on the verge of trying the more thorough and effective psychoanalysis of which Miss Freeman is a champion.

The average person writing a letter about himself does so with more personal honesty than one writing an article for publication. The fact that these quotations are expressions of personal need, voicing the need of others in such intimate terms, may well be helpful to many. The device of using the letter and answer method for an entire book, though carefully selected and arranged, does tend to become repetitive and boring before the last page.

Miss Freeman evidences deep understanding of the effect of emotional disturbance on one's physical well-being, personality, and motives. She recognizes the intended wholeness of Man, that what affects one part of his being affects all of it. She is critical of the physician and surgeon who treat the body and do not recognize emotional need. She attempts to allay the

fears of those who still believe there is stigma attached to those seeking this kind of help. She issues strong warning against indulging in tranquilizers, self-analysis, and do-it-yourself or short-term methods advertised by quacks, with the expectation of a cure.

While deploring the scarcity of competent well-qualified psychoanalysts, this, to Miss Freeman, is the answer for those searching for love. An attempt fully to describe psychoanalysis to the layman is impossible. The author's text here might well be "Come and see."

Miss Freeman has given us a book that can give hope to those who find themselves within its pages. For the pastor, teacher, and counselor it provides insight into people's loneliness and despair, some reasons for human behavior, and the strong personal testimony of the author that "I have been there, too. There is a way out."

BETSY M. RODENMAYER

•

Pastoral Psychology in Practice: Willibald Demal, O.S.B., D.D.; P. J. Kenedy and Sons, New York, 1955. 249 pp. $4.00.

Here is a pastoral psychology book written by a European Roman Catholic Priest, Father Willibald Demal. Throughout his book Father Demal presents the need for administering the sacraments, or a ministry of religion, with an understanding of the individual disposition of persons. Steeped strictly in the theology and thought of the Roman Church, Father Demal drives home the point that the pastoral duties to people should be carried out in the knowledge of the character structure of the individual persons. Not only does Father Demal deal extensively with the various character disorders such as the psychopathic personality and the problems of schizophrenia, but he deals realistically with the developmental, psychological stages of man from childhood to old age. With a detailed discussion of the nature of personalities possessing such traits as compulsive or hysterical symptoms, he uses some of the better concepts of dynamic psychiatry. Of major significance is Father Demal's presentation of the psychological meaning which different religious approaches in pastoral work will have to a personality suffering, for instance, from depression. The individual temperaments of persons are considered of utmost importance in this book, while at the same time religion is not sold short.

The pastor is constantly in need of source material which will help him better to understand the psychological aspects of man's character structure. One of the chief values of *Pastoral Psychology in Practice* is that it gives an excellent presentation of the psychological needs of man, as well as a very inclusive description of the various psychological pathologies ranging all the way from neurosis to the more pathological forms of emotional disorders. His descriptiveness is not clothed in a technical language, but it is simply and understandably written. One may not find his general psychological classifications very acceptable, but his psychological thought is quite sound.

The theology of this book may be of difficulty to some pastors, but if they can lay aside their resistances in this respect, they will find the book very thought-provoking. Father Demal gives by far one of the best presenta-

tions of the ministry to people with respect to the overall psychological needs of persons. This book should make known to a pastor the deeper satisfaction of the ministry, when the pastor has a deeper knowledge of the psychological nature of man.

Of special interest in this writing is the psychological problems of the priest who ministers. Though many thoughts in this area will not be relevant to the Protestant clergy, it should be suggestive to the need of an understanding of the minister who does the ministering.

L. MACK POWELL

•

Religious Doctrine and Medical Practice: Richard Thomas Barton, M.D.; Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1958. 94 pp. $3.75.

Here is further evidence of the growing awareness among physicians that their patients' religious cultures are often of considerable importance and influence. The author describes his book as "a practical guide primarily for the physician but also for the nurse, the dietitian, and the medical administrator, who is confronted by religious beliefs and doctrinal habits with which he is unfamiliar. It is designed to provide a reference for questions of religious dogma as they pertain to the practice of medicine." Hospital chaplains will also find it a helpful and competent reference.

After a brief chapter on "The Religious Approach to Healing," Dr. Barton proceeds to take up various religions under such general categories as: "Religions of Asiatic Origin," "Religions of Middle Eastern Origin," "Religions of Western Origin," "Religions of American Origin," and "Religions of Healthy-Mindedness." Throughout the entire presentation there is a commendable fairness and a wise avoidance of the irrelevant.

ROLLIN J. FAIRBANKS

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Der Psychotherapeut als Partner: Eine appelative Psychotherapie: Alphonse Maeder; Zurich, Rascher Verlag, 1957. 140 Seiten. Fr. $11.90.

At age 75 Maeder rounds out a number of themes which have dominated his life as a psychoanalyst and therapist. Two of these are the idea of synthesis, stressing the unity and wholeness of personality and self-healing of the soul, and the relationship of psychotherapist and patient as partners. In these points he goes beyond Freud, whose theory of transference, originally a forward step in healing, became a hindrance to proper development of therapy because of its limiting perspectives. Maeder's standpoint is that sound psychotherapy has three components: the empirical-scientific, the "magical," and the religious. The interpersonal relationships of the doctor and patient root in the depths of the collective unconscious and become activated through the existential need of the ill person and the willingness of the physician to help. The physician works not only as a person but also mediates a superpersonal quality of saving love which has transcendent religious significance.

The book includes a valuable memoir regarding his early relations with Freud, Bleuler, Jung, and others and an autobiographical account of his jour-

ney from Freud to an interpersonal and religious perspective which transcends the strict psychoanalytic conception of transference.

WALTER G. MUELDER

•

The Family in Psychotherapy: C. F. Midelfort, M.D.; McGraw-Hill, New York, 1957. 200 pp. $6.50.

The author (who is associated with the Adolf Gunderson Medical Foundation) relates in this book his experiences as a psychiatrist in a general hospital in which he uses family therapy in addition to insulin therapy and individual therapy with patients suffering from various types of mental illness, psychopathic personalities, and psychoneuroses. He uses a combination of individual and family therapy. Selected family members provide actual physical care and affection for patients receiving insulin.

Dr. Midelfort starts with the limitation of individual therapy, pointing out that often, as the patient improves, he pulls away from his family. The author feels that with *family* therapy the psychiatrist helps to initiate common objective reactions so that the family strengths are maintained. He begins with the assumption that mental illness is a family illness which is out of balance, and that there are usually strengths within the total family which can be utilized for a new balance. A total of 31 case histories are provided, including samples of family therapy, so that the reader is left in little doubt concerning both the author's successes and failures. (He reports his failures!)

Anyone who is interested in exploring relatively new approaches to the problem of the treatment of emotional disturbances and mental illness will find this a thoughtful book. It is addressed primarily to psychiatrists, but clergymen with some mental hospital clinical pastoral training or other psychiatric orientation will also find it useful. Ministers will discover that they, too, have been engaged in a sort of family therapy which has of more recent date been frowned upon. Perhaps this concept of family and individual therapy will challenge present practice, both in psychiatric and in pastoral practice.

JOHN R. THOMAS

•

Counseling and Psychotherapy with the Mentally Retarded: edited by C. L. Stacy and M. F. DeMartino; The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1957. 472 pp. $7.50.

The publication of a volume of collected papers on the subject of counseling and psychotherapy with the mentally retarded marks a significant milestone in the whole field of counseling. It is only within the past several years that there has been sufficient material written to justify such a collection, and sufficient interest to encourage publication. Until recently, as Sara Neham remarks in one of the introductory papers, in thinking of retardation, ". . . 'congenital' seemed to explain causation, and custody fulfilled the hopes of therapy." Changes in this attitude are reflected in the discussions in the present volume.

Six brief papers in the introductory section offer some perspective through

a discussion of historical attitudes, provide clarification of the current problem areas, and set the hopeful mood of the entire book through expressing so clearly the conviction that these people are worth helping and can be helped!

In this first section, too, an attempt is made to clarify the goals of such help and to make valid distinction between therapy that is geared to "curing" mental deficiency and that which is intended to help the retardate with the emotional problems that he faces with such a handicap. Although several authors later make this same distinction in their articles, no effort has been made by the editors to separate the papers according to this focus and the reader may experience some confusion by the use of the word "therapy" in both contexts.

In the remaining nine sections, which include both theoretical discussion and case material, various aspects of counseling mental defectives are explored. There are interesting sections on therapy through the use of such methods as psychodrama, group sessions, and play techniques. A very practical collection of papers deals with the counseling of the parents of retardates, and proves helpful in clarifying some of the problems that are generated or awakened within parents who have retarded youngsters, and suggests ways in which they, too, can be helped.

On the whole, the plan of organization and the selection of the papers seem sound; although, as in any collection, there is some unevenness. The editors, however, have chosen to abridge all of their selections (few run over ten pages), and some of the abridgments are jerky and a little difficult to follow. The similiarities of the material discussed in several different papers in a given section make them seem repetitive, and there seems little justification for including all of them unless to marshal evidence in support of the validity of a given procedure. One might wish that the editors had chosen fewer papers and presented some of them more fully. The inclusion of some discussion of therapeutic attempts with defectives in which the results were not as encouraging might have served to show some of the hardships involved in this kind of work and to indicate areas of ignorance without dimming the essential optimism of the book.

Certainly anyone who is involved in counseling and who, consequently, may well face the possibility of helping people with this problem of retardation would find a wealth of helpful material gathered here; and, more important, perhaps, would come away from even a casual browsing with a more hopeful outlook toward help for these people and a deeper sense of the inherent value of a human being.

KENNETH W. WATSON

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The Adopted Break Silence: Jean M. Patton; Life History Study Center, Philadelphia, 1955. 164 pp. $2.50.

The clergyman who finds himself somewhat at a loss in bringing help to the person having trouble around adoption, whether she be an adopted person, an adopting parent, or a person giving up a child for adoption, will certainly have his confusion confounded by what he reads in this book. Miss Patton starts out with a commendable premise, namely, that if the mature person who has been adopted would break his silence and speak out, we might

have greater understanding of the problems and ways of coping with them. Too soon, however, we discover that the sample is miserably small, the jargon which is liberally used is almost incomprehensible much of the time, and that the speaking out too often is confined to the author who, as an adopted person, would seem to have many unsolved problems which seem to get in the way of an honest appraisal of what those queried are saying and of what has been learned in the field of adoption in the past twenty years.

CHARLOTTE J. DUNMORE

•

Growing up to Love: A Guide to Sex Education for Parents; H. Clair Amstutz, M.D.; Herald Press, Scottdale, Pa., 1956. 103 pp. $2.50.

There are handbooks aplenty to guide parents in their duties; one approaches a new one with qualms. This book lures us on, however, by being written by an experienced physician and informed churchman, a practised writer and a father of six. He deserves our humble attention.

Dr. Amstutz has written with fresh emphasis and a reassuring simplicity of spirit. Sex education is oriented to love within the family and God's creation; to a "basic morality of family life" rather than to social conformity or practice. It is the very confusion of the times that pushes us to basic conviction. To grow up *in* love is the crucial education, not given facts at a proper (or improper) time. The facts are important, but their meaning is colored and interpreted by the atmosphere in which the child is reared. "Love begets love." In this, the author points out, the church must play a supporting role. With these premises permeating the book, Dr. Amstutz leaves no stone unturned.

The book is decidedly Christian-centered without resorting to pious platitudes. Its style should neither confound the humble nor bore the learned. It has humor but is not coy. Its relative brevity and low price are added attractions. Clergymen who have little time or opportunity to examine the exhaustive literature on this subject, but want a few approved titles to recommend, may well check this one to see if it suits the purpose. At the back of the book are further suggestions of pamphlets, films, and books.

ROSEMARY L. CLARK

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Facts of Love and Life for Teen-Agers: Evelyn Millis Duval; Association Press, New York, 1956. 426 pp. $3.50.

"Love is the strange bewilderment which overtakes one person on account of another person," jocosely say James Thurber and E. B. White in *Is Sex Necessary?* Evelyn Duval, however, presents love in much broader terms in this thoughtful exposition of young love.

Love (says the author) is a continuing process, a ladder of development from the narcissistic love of the new-born infant, through the stages of child-parent love, sibling love (and rivalry!), affection of playmates, acquisition of best friends, hero-worship, attachment to members of the opposite sex, selection of the marriage partner, devotion to one's children, on to the final stage of altruistic love for people outside one's immediate circle.

In presenting to teen-agers their own awkward and often painful brushes with heterosexual relations within this wide framework of emotional growth, Mrs. Duval does them a great service, for she puts the emphasis where it ought to be on the importance of learning to give of oneself in a human relationship. The long-range view also helps to lessen the young person's acute need for immediate gratification upon entering this new field of experience.

Within this framework, Mrs. Duval writes with frankness and practicality. The physiological and emotional differences between boys and girls are accurately stated, and the facts concerning human reproduction are presented in an explicit manner. A considerable portion of the book is devoted to the folkways (if you will) of dating—factual information about what is expected of a boy or girl in the many tortuous channels of this tribal custom.

Out of the material comes a culminating philosophy about preparation for marriage which is physically healthy, psychologically sound, and spiritually sensitive.

While not a profound book, *Facts of Love and Life for Teen-Agers* is about as solid a presentation as one can find of the things young people want to know about how to get on with the opposite sex. It is written with taste and understanding.

MARGARET WHITE CAMPBELL

•

The Sexually Adequate Female: Frank S. Caprio, M.D.; Medical Research Press, New York, 1953. 223 pp. $3.50.

The author, a prolific writer on sexual matters, is a Washington psychiatrist. In this particular volume, despite the title, Dr. Caprio seems to be writing largely about the sexually *in*adequate female. He offers fragments from psychiatric histories to illustrate sexual problems encountered by women allegedly lacking in sexual education or orientation.

While the presentation admittedly includes much worthwhile information, nevertheless it is marked by a regrettable masculine bias which infers that woman's primary *raison d'etre* is to gratify the sexual needs of her man. The author persistently views sexual maladjustments as being causative rather than sometimes symptomatic of other marital problems. The book also is more illustrative (and sensational) than it is therapeutic. For this reviewer it has doubtful value.

ROLLIN J. FAIRBANKS

•

Learning to Live as a Widow: Marion Langer; Julian Messner, Inc., New York, 1957. 255 pp. $3.75.

There is a deep need for a book on this subject, and the author is to be commended for taking such an assignment. Most widows will probably read it avidly, looking for help, or at the very least for a feeling of kinship with others in the world. And certainly the clergy, in ministering to the bereaved, will find it an extremely valuable resource.

The subject is treated practically, realistically, and specifically, using actual

cases for illustrative purposes, although frequently the problems stated and their solutions may be so specific as to limit the number of readers who would find help in them.

For this reviewer, a widow of two years and a churchwoman, the book has been disappointing in its secular, this-world orientation although, in all fairness, the author has admittedly not attempted a larger scope. The book is obviously sound psychologically and it certainly provides remarkable insight and valuable support. But from a religious point of view it seems more remedial than curative. It is not oriented to a person who believes in God, who accepts His will, who knows there is eternal life. For this reviewer the Church's teachings are the fundamental truths for which an understanding of psychodynamics cannot substitute.

The foregoing criticism, however, does not mean that the book is without value for the Christian. It tackles the symptoms, the selfish and human emotions encountered in bereavement and it contains a carefully prepared Resource Appendix that will serve as a helpful reference for the parish minister. It should prove very useful even in a limited way for those readers firmly oriented to God, submissive to His will and confident of eternal life.

There is a strong, compassionate note throughout the book that never descends to maudlin sentimentality. There are helpful suggestions on how to get to know men, how to explain death to children, in fact how to meet the whole problem of social and emotional readjustment. But this is not simply a "how to" book; it not only describes but it *explains*. And it is this remarkably penetrating understanding that constitutes its unique value.

GRACE BAINBRIDGE

•

A Belief in People—A History of Family Social Work: Margaret E. Rich; Family Service Association of America, New York, 1957. 190 pp. $3.50.

Almost fifty years ago, Margaret Rich was, as she put it, "introduced to charity organization and to the high adventure of social casework," when the Boston Associated Charities employed her as an "apprentice worker." Fortunately for us, she finished the manuscript for her *A Belief in People* just a few months before her death. Now this volume lines out in print her careful study of the origins and growth of the citizens' movement that came into being in the 1870's to "organize charity." A parallel interest in those early days was to engage in informed social action, but one notes on several pages that everyday needs of many families proved so pressing that social agencies found it almost impossible to continue this.

Beginning with descriptions of the work of the "friendly visitors" organized by the early family societies, Miss Rich documents the evolvement of social casework. The role of the clergy in these beginnings is clearly described, especially the leadership of the Rev. S. Humphreys Gurteen, who came from England to Buffalo, New York, in 1877. The Rev. Mr. Gurteen had been influenced effectively by the Rev. Thomas Chalmers, a Glasgow clergyman, "who had tried out successfully a plan to help his parishoners develop their own capabilities rather than depend on economic relief." Gurteen had been affected also by the leaders of the famous English Charity Organization So-

ciety. Through a series of Sunday evening sermons preached in St. Paul's Cathedral, Buffalo, and the publication of his *A Handbook of Charity Organization,* this English clergyman helped found the first Family Society in this country, that in Buffalo, and his writings gave leadership to many other agencies throughout the nation.

"Public or Private Relief," the subject matter of Chapter IV, gives the reader an excellent historical and factual background to ponder some of the same issues churches and social agencies face today. The contents of this chapter alone make this book rewarding reading for both clergy and laymen who are interested in helping people effectively.

Miss Rich's account of the growth of family agencies, issuing finally in the formation and services of the Family Service Association of America, precedes interesting material during World War II and since.

No one who would understand modern social casework and public welfare can afford to miss reading this informative, challenging book which is also now the last will and testament of a great American, Margaret Rich, who really believed in people and did something about her belief.

HENRY H. WIESBAUER

•

The Family in the Money World: Frances Lomas Feldman; Family Service Association of America, New York, 1957. 188 pp. $2.50.

This book approaches the question of counseling families on money matters from two points of view: the "objective" and the "subjective." The objective deals with the economics of spending income. On this score, the book may be regarded as first rate. It recognizes that no two families, or spending units, are alike in their tastes or needs; that circumstances alter cases; that there is sense to the rules of thumb which have evolved through time, and which suggest, e.g., that no more than one week's income should be spent for rent; that installment obligations should be limited to some percentage of income nearer 10 than 20, that industrial insurance is expensive and wasteful. A particularly useful table on page 164 suggests some of the limits of the percentage of income which should be spent for various purposes at various levels of income. Throughout there is a thoughful and reasoned description of the problem of allocating income among various competing uses, including savings, which appeals to an economist as well done.

An economist is not in as good a position to judge the adequacy of the subjective treatment of money problems. The evidence, however, points to the conclusion that the book is equally competent and insightful in this area. Money may not perhaps be the root of all evil, nor need it, like power, corrupt. But some superficial family problems are exacerbated by budgetary difficulties, because of the sensitive nature of money. Earning capacity and capacity to handle the expenditure of income effectively have been criteria for social approval or disapproval more than the craftsman's skills or the social graces, stretching back to the parable of the servants and the talents. And Mrs. Feldman is alert to the possibility that superficial money problems may reflect more deep-seated difficulties, so that budgetary counseling may well not be enough. Problems of parent-child, husband-wife, or old people-young

people may take a monetary form, but in reality represent a social or personal, rather than an economic, problem.

This is a useful book for counselors of families in poor districts or middle class areas where a significant proportion of family problems concern extravagance, debt, sharing of income, and similar problems.

CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER

•

Their Brothers' Keepers: Philip Friedman; Crown Publishers, New York, 1957. 224 pp. $3.00.

This book is not a story but a document filled with the pathos of human tragedy and the triumph of the spirit that identifies itself most completely with Christian ideals. It is a vivid panorama of the individual cruelties and class sufferings that were experienced at the hand of the Gestapo during the reign of Hitler, and it serves to stir the conscience of those who profess to be Christian into an awareness that injustice does occur despite our attempts at human relationships. However this is not a story of human frailty and limitation. It is a display of the strength and dedication of the discerning human beings who live beyond provincial codes.

While the author has graphically displayed the struggle for freedom, we must be mindful of what Viktor Frankl says on the psychology of the concentration camp in *The Doctor and the Soul*: "Freedom is not something we 'have' and therefore can lose; freedom is what we 'are.'"

Great tribute to the silent heroes of the last world conflict begun in small villages like Cracow is displayed to the bitter ends at Dachau. The clergyman will be reminded that we are not at the end of such a conflict, for the implications described in this book could also become a part of America's struggle for freedom from racial discrimination. Certainly it is in the pressures of the individual neurotic leader whose needs are fed by the portents of the cultural time that we see passion parading its terrible consequences.

KEITH W. KEIDEL

•

Protestant — Catholic — Jew: Will Herberg; Doubleday, New York, 1956. 320 pp. $4.00.

The working pastor, whether in parish, hospital, school, or industry, will find this book an extremely helpful essay which will add greatly to his own understanding of the contemporary American religious scene. It is written clearly, documented carefully, keeps the reader's interest to the end, and gives a penetrating analysis of "American religion" and American religious communities.

The subtitle, "An Essay in American Religious Sociology," gives the framework within which the author discusses the three major religious groupings of the United States. The historical and sociological developments of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism are traced from the first immigrants to America to the present day. The changes resulting from the various waves of immigration throw clear light on the problems which faced all three re-

ligious groups as they endeavored to assimilate the newcomers. Herberg suggests the thesis of "the third generation's return to religion," which applies with particular relevance to American Roman Catholicism and Judaism.

The author suggests that the American today locates himself within our cultural and social life by means of his religious identification, in contrast to "ethnic" location of previous generations of Americans. In other words, a part of the American's return to religion is due to his need for social location. He makes a strong case for the presence of an underlying "American" religion which makes possible the self-identification within any of the three religious groupings.

Protestant ministers will profit especially from his discussion of Protestantism's shift from a position as the dominant religion in the early days to its present status as only one of three religions. He discusses Catholic-Protestant tension in the light of this perspective and deals directly with the symptoms such as "the school issue" and "the welfare issue."

This reviewer must take exception to some of the author's conclusions regarding Protestant-Catholic tensions, especially to those on page 258.

The abundance of footnotes makes this a valuable reference work for the clergyman who wishes to make a more careful study, and the length of the footnotes gives much "flavor" to the entire book. In conclusion, this study of the backgrounds and current positions and tensions of our three major American religious groupings will help the individual pastor to be more objective about the situation and will challenge him to do careful thinking.

JOHN REA THOMAS

•

The Christian Tradition and the Unity We Seek: Albert C. Outler; Oxford University Press, New York, 1957. 165 pp. $3.25.

The ecumenical movement, which the author describes as *"the* great representative occurrence in modern Christian history," has (so the opening chapter argues) come to a critical stage in its development. "The ecumenical honeymoon is over." Attempts to achieve unity by way of a universally accepted doctrinal Confession, or by way of trust in a common Christian experience, or even by the attempt to "leap-frog history" and to turn to the New Testament itself for a model of the contemporary church—all have run into stubborn resistance. Every such project ignores the fact that each separate Christian communion interprets its doctrinal foundations, its experience, and Scripture itself through the eyes of its partisan history. "Partisan history cannot aid in the restoration of broken community."

Can our separated partisan histories rediscover a tradition which was once a common possession and which could once again become the foundation of unity in the Body of Christ? Dr. Outler argues that this is not only possible, but that the ecumenical movement, insofar as it has been a success in the last half century, has given us a foretaste of such rediscovery. We do have a history and a tradition in common—that of the Church during the first millenium of its existence. In a masterly analysis of the era of the early Church Councils down to Chalcedon and beyond, Dr. Outler brings to light

the fact that community could manifest itself with only minimal doctrinal uniformity. The Creed of Nicea—to cite a clue example—assured the preservation against the attacks of heresy of nothing more than the primitive New Testament confession of Jesus as "the Lord." The ecumenical movement of our day is making the (to us) astounding discovery that community is possible once more under the simple shared confession of "Jesus Christ as God and Savior," the single doctrinal test of membership in the World Council of Churches. Dr. Outler, accordingly, presents as the basic thesis of his book: "Christian community is primary; Christian doctrines are explicative." The Christ-Event culminated in the appearance on the historical scene of a community—the Fellowship of the Holy Spirit. We have Pentecost in common, the Christ-Event continuing in history and constituting our common tradition.

Does Dr. Outler's call to the churches to "contract back into history" solve all of our ecumenical problems? Dr. Outler himself would repudiate any such presumption. An Anglican reader—guilty, no doubt, of the partisan reading of Church history which Dr. Outler decries—misses a treatment of the unifying power of the common worship tradition and polity clearly to be found in the story of the early Church. This, so an Anglican loves to argue, can provide a bond of community which offers precisely the freedom in the area of doctrine and of Christian experience and the interpretation of Scripture for which Dr. Outler pleads. But Dr. Outler's exploration of his theme opens doors for a new era of ecumenical discourse. It may enlarge the horizon of the ecumenical movement and move us forward from the "dead center" of mere comparative ecclesiology where a long halt now threatens.

THEODORE O. WEDEL

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Experiment in Depth: P. W. Martin; Pantheon Press, New York, 1956. 275 pp. $4.50.

We have in this book an attempt to synthesize the views of C. G. Jung, Arnold Toynbee, and T. S. Eliot. This synthesis is for the purpose of developing an interpretation of man's present predicament and of proposing directions to which modern man may turn for escape and fulfillment. This frankly is a tall order. A Freudian such as this reviewer is unlikely to have very much *a priori* conviction of the possible success of such a synthesis or of the possible efficacy of such a prescription for our times. However, some pleasant surprises were encountered, beyond the expected reiteration of much which has been regarded for long as irrelevant, unproven, and unprovable, namely the recital of Jungian psychology and its relation to religion.

As might be expected, the early sections of the work are directed to an enunciation of the contributions of the three sources of the problem. This is competent, readable, and clear—that is, to the extent to which this reviewer can judge. William James is brought in again and again as the principal point of reference to psychology of religion, and this is a welcome resurrection of a great but neglected, maligned, and misunderstood pathfinder in this field.

What appears especially attractive is the final, twelfth chapter entitled "The Return." Here, after pointing the way toward the "experiment in depth," an "exploration of the inner world" by introspective search, interpersonal confrontation, and revivifying application of the great themes of

mythology and religion to contemporary life, the author stresses the importance of returning to the everyday world, hallowing it, and redeeming it. The latter movement must, he asserts, come through both individual and corporate effort.

What is most exciting about Martin's approach are his hints for methodology, namely that empiricism from the side of spirituality and scientific openness to the hitherto "non-scientific" be brought together.

Some adherents from both camps will be appalled or at least surprised by the author's intermingling of concepts and themes from so many sources. There will be those who will feel that both science and religion have been done a disservice. Others probably will object on emotional or linguistic grounds that Martin's metaphors and symbols introduce confusion rather than clarity and belong to an older age of mythology. This reviewer believes, however, that the author has discovered ways to communicate through and about these metaphors and symbols (of which this book may be only the beginning), and has cast much light on the interfaces or no-man's-land between multiple areas. Freud, too, had his mythology, as he readily enough admitted, and so for that matter have science and religion. After we have de-mythologized, how shall we re-mythologize, and if so, can't we do it together—relating religion, the social sciences, and the arts?

All this (says Martin) is in the direction of freedom, and he quotes Thomas Aquinas on the purpose of freedom. "To know the truth about God and to live in communities." What the author goes on to point out are the implications—namely that knowing the truth about God and the truth about self are interrelated and that both types of knowledge, to be meaningful beyond the purely academic, must be knowledge-in-action.

EARL A. LOOMIS, JR., M.D.

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Psychiatric Studies, Volume I of the *Collected Works*: C. G. Jung; Pantheon Books, New York, 1957. 269 pp. $3.75.

The Bollingen Foundation has undertaken to publish a complete edition in English of the works of Dr. Jung. This present volume is the sixth so published, and numbered first in a series that will ultimately include at least 18 volumes.

In this particular volume will be found Jung's dissertation for his medical degree (1902), "On the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena," wherein he describes an extended series of contacts with an hysterical adolescent girl who functions for a time as an ecstatic medium. Also included is a short paper on an anomaly of memory, "crytomnesia," in which he discusses the phenomena of being able to recall by indirect associational pathways experiences not directly remembered. There are other papers on manic depressive mood disorders, simulated insanity, and contradictory diagnosis.

For the pastoral reader these papers have some interesting high spots as in the discussion of alleged plagiarism of Nietzsche, and in the beautifully written paragraph on "men of thought" (para. No. 175). In general, how-

ever, the book would appear to be of interest primarily to the informed student of depth psychology who can infuse the frequently archaic and obsolete terminology of these pioneering papers with contemporary equivalents or with historical significance.

THOMAS W. KLINK

■

Symbols of Transformation: C. G. Jung; Bollingen Series, Pantheon Press, New York, 1956. 567 pp. $5.00.

Volume 5 of the currently appearing collected works of Dr. Jung is a rewritten version of his early and brilliant study of the writings and visions of Miss Miller while her schizophrenic illness was still in its prodromal stages. Those who know the *Psychology of the Unconscious* (first published in English in 1916) will miss some of the provocative and always interesting interpretations, but may find themselves in a position to welcome the new illustrative material and theoretical elaborations. The complexity of the presentation stems from Dr. Jung's conviction that historical material (derived in large measure from his phenomenological understanding of comparative mythology) can throw new light on individual psychological problems. Few would be in sound position to challenge his thesis that helping the patient to assimilate and get into conceptual framework at least part of his unconscious productions and repairing the menacing dissociation brought by the new experiences guards against the dangerous isolation felt by confrontation with an incomprehensible and irrational aspect of the personality. Believing as he does that the productions of the unconscious have teleology, that dreams, visions, fantasies, and delusions express a situation of the patient, that the doctor must understand the situation before he can hope that his psychological treatment will be helpful, and that the pursuit of a science is an endeavor to augment and deepen human knowledge, Dr. Jung set himself the monumental task of examining individual fantasy in relation to its sources. The problems thus discovered are enormous in scope, proportion, and complexity.

INA MAY GREER

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Modern Canterbury Pilgrims: Edited by James A. Pike; Morehouse-Gorham, New York, 1956. 317 pp. $3.85.

As the subtitle of this collection of essays indicates—(*Modern Canterbury Pilgrims: And Why They Chose the Episcopal Church*)—the goal of the authors is to assist others on the pilgrimage "home" which they have made. The main value to non-Episcopalians, present or potential, is to indicate some of the motivational factors operative in leading intellectuals from, as well as to, the Christian Church. In this way, one can leave aside the contentions of Pike *et al.* that the Episcopal Church is for them the truest church, if not the *only* true one, and find help for his own evangelistic ministry.

Though the authors vary in religious background and present renown, including such "names" as W. H. Auden, Edward Heimann, and William Pollard alongside of a coal miner named Budzanski, there are a number of common elements in their stories. The path out of the Church or synagogue was usually a gradual one. They drifted away from religious institutions since

they considered them to be irrelevant, dogmatic, and authoritarian. Similiarly, the pilgrimage to Canterbury (and, hopefully, to Nazareth and Jerusalem as well) was by slow stages, affected by many "chance circumstances" later interpreted as the work of the "heavenly angler."

Books played an important role in these conversions, with writers such as William Temple, C. S. Lewis, and Reinhold Niebuhr (no Canterbury Pilgrim he!) demonstrating the contemporary relevance and transforming power of the Christian faith. For these twenty-three converts—from Judaism, Roman Catholicism, other Protestant denominations, agnosticism, and atheism—the Protestant Episcopal Church represented a congenial Via Media. They rejoiced in the combination of historical Catholicity, reforming Protestantism, and the modern liberal temper which they found in this branch of Christ's Church.

At times when reading the essays, one is tempted to agree with Dean Pike's first sentence in his foreword, "There should be no such book as this." For, as he warns, "There will be those who feel that the issuance of such a work is divisive, uncharitable, and unecumenical." And, one can wonder also why these particular trophies were chosen for the sectarian scalp stick, in the implicit assumption that intellectuals are harder catches for God than are other people. But, the general effect is a positive one. The book awakens clergy of all denominations to the need for each of us to make his own the threefold heritage in which we all share—Catholic, Protestant, and Liberal—that we may meet the challenges of the time in which we live, and win new converts to the Living Lord.

WILLIAM DOUGLAS

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Man: His First Million Years: Ashley Montagu; World Publishing Co., Cleveland, Ohio, 1957. 249 pp. $3.75.

Ashley Montagu, anthropologist and lecturer, in this volume presents a very elementary account of man's physical evolution, his differentiation into racial stocks or major ethnic groupings and the nature and characteristics of the cultures man has created. The treatment of man's physical ancestry describes both the "classical" and the more recent finds of the paleoanthropologists and illustrates many of them with pen and ink drawings. The discussion of evolutionary factors involved in the differentiation of man is regretably brief. Montagu postulates the mental unity of mankind, as would almost all anthropologists, but in this volume he does not attempt to marshal the evidence that would help refute racists.

The treatment of culture—man's social heritage—tends to be fragmentary at best. Dr. Montagu seems more interested in illustrating the diversity of cultural forms and in defining for the reader some of the anthropologist's concepts than in emphasizing the integrity and coherence of cultures as wholes or in trying to get across to the reader the subtle coerciveness of cultural patterns. Most clergymen are likely to want more details about the process whereby the norms and values of the culture become guiding influences upon the individual, not merely because they are supported by formal institutions or sanctions but because they are taken for granted.

There is a superficiality and glibness to this volume which is likely to

make it most appropriate to the layman who is both unsophisticated and only mildly interested in the nature of man. Clergymen who want to know what modern anthropology has to offer might better either try one of the standard college texts, such as that of Herskovits, or of Beals and Hoijer, or read Kluckhohn's *Mirror for Man* or Benedict's classic *Patterns of Culture*. The present work is much briefer than any of these, which may recommend it to those who desire a quick, light treatment.

JOHN A. CLAUSEN

OUR REVIEWERS

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CURRENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

EDITED BY THE REV. JOSEPH FLETCHER

"Re-evaluation of Lobotomy," in *The Psychiatric Bulletin,* 8:3, Summer, 1958, pp. 50-51.

Dramatic successes with new drugs for the treatment of severe personality disorders have invited a re-evaluation of lobotomy, or leucotomy. Chemotherapy presupposes that biochemical imbalance is a major factor in psychosis. Biochemistry may do away with any further need of neurosurgery, which started back before 3000 B.C. The primitive practice bored holes to free demons but it was no more successful than modern brain surgery, which claims only partial success in treating psychoses or pain.

Egas Moniz was present at the 1935 neurosurgical congress when Fulton and Jacobsen of Yale reported their experiments with chimpanzees. He and Almeida Lima then worked with human patients, successfully enough to gain Moniz the Nobel prize in 1949. Freeman and Watts at Georgetown University introduced it into America.

Lobotomy has been a kind of last-resort therapy, used after the failure of psychotherapy, occupational therapy, insulin and electric shock. Pollock listed nine criteria for the selection of patients for surgical treatment, the chief among them being aggressive or sadistic tendencies, dissociative hysterical and hypochondriacal manifestations, any chronic functional psychosis with paranoid manifestations, chronic psychotic states with mood fluctuations, especially those not responding even to shock treatment.

The patients responding best are catatonics and paranoids, or those suffering depressions from involutional melancholia or from cerebral arteriosclerosis. Some hold the opinion that lobotomy deteriorates personality. It has been found that even when it works as crisis-care it leaves the patient deprived intellectually and emotionally.

There are other problems about it. What is the physicians' responsibility to the inner core of the patient, the essential personality? Is there an "inner" or "core" personality? May medicine legally and morally alter the basic structure of the person? Does psychosurgery alter the patient's legal status? We do not know yet to what extent the new drug techniques may carry problems of this kind, but at least they do not have about them the irrevocability and trauma associated with surgery. "It is to be hoped that the present and proposed experiments in biochemistry will afford more knowledge of the genesis of psychosis and will thereby make possible more effective and less radical forms of therapy."

JOSEPH FLETCHER

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"A Contribution to the Problem of Religious Healing," by Rev. Bernard Martin, *Wege zum Menschen,* 9:7, July, 1957, pp. 228-230.

The problem of spiritual healing is not only involved in theology. The significance of the future and at the same time present Kingdom of God, and the whole question of faith in the Kingdom, must be explored. Questions about the importance and nature of both faith and prayer, of absolution sacramentally and the Biblical miracles have to be faced. An exclusively theological investigation cannot solve these questions or illuminate them. Psychology has an important contribution to make because the religious life has its psychic depths. C. G. Jung, for example, has helped us to find some answers, at least provisionally. Back in 1932 he wrote: "Among all my patients older than 35 there is not one of them whose ultimate and decisive problem is not religious. Everybody is sick because of their losing the 'religio,' and cannot be healed until they have rediscovered it." It seems as if the falling away of the religious life and the tremendous increase of neurosis are parallel developments. Additionally, the findings of modern psychosomatic medicine must be taken into account. Medicine, psychotherapeutics, and pastoral care have to work together, not separately.

What does the term "miraculous healing" mean? It is essential to notice that very often in translations the Greek word "semeion" is translated as "miracle" when it should be rendered as "sign." The Biblical miracles are "signs" of the coming and the already-present Kingdom of God. Christ's healings are "signs" of the fact that in the Kingdom there is no illness. The meaning of this is that miracles are not arbitrary intrusions of God into the world contradicting natural laws but "signs" that the true law of the world is not of sin, sorrow, sickness, and death but, rather, a fully developed life. The "signs" are only fragmentary and provisional, although concrete and "true" factors of reality.

So the physician is a fellow-laborer in the Kingdom. All medical healing is a "sign" like spiritual healing. Sometimes both kinds of healing are required for the healing itself. The medical part is concerned to see that the necessary physical side is done and done well; the spiritual deliverance is none the less necessary even when the surgical, for example, is successful. Without medical care the pastor would not be able to heal spiritually, and without pastoral care the physician's success is only partial.

Psychosomatics show the way to this kind of cooperation and synopsis of healing, but up to this time it has been a parallelism or double-level of "physis" and "psyche." This needs to be truly merged and unified. Psychosomatics has to become "pneuomopsychosomatics." Physical healing, psychic healing, and absolution from sin, together with acceptance into redeeming fellowship—all of this has to be seen together. It is a serious lack in Protestantism that personal confession and absolution have been condemned into oblivion. Confession and absolution strive for deliverance from guilt (not only from guilt feelings), through the concrete experience of remission. Certainly sickness is not a punishment for any particular sin, but the close connection between sinfulness and sickness is obvious and unquestioned. Both need pastoral attention. Not to acknowledge it reveals ignorance of modern psychiatric medicine. Man is a "pneuomopsychosomatic" unity, and physicians, psychotherapists, and pastors are all responsible for the work of healing.

KLAUS REBLIN

"The New Burdens of Masculinity," by Helen Mayer Hacker, *Marriage and Family Living*, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (August 1957), pp. 227-33.

Do men today, particularly urban middle-class white men, in fulfilling masculine social role-expectations experience difficulties unknown to their fathers? Contemporary masculine problems which tend to give an affirmative answer may be viewed as arising from three sources. First, there are the burdens of masculinity which have survived from earlier periods, but which modern conditions have aggravated. Many of these center around the role of breadwinner and manifest themselves as follows: (1) the greater compulsion to succeed, if not from themselves, then from their wives: (2) the lack of an alternative to gainful employment, even if one has money or marries it, a man *must* work; (3) the identification of economic success with masculinity; (4) the need for politicking or using traditionally feminine forms of behavior for ingratiating superiors, customers, etc., and yet at the same time being a strong he-man, a good provider who protects and defends his wife and children; (5) the feeling of being threatened by women in industry who cast a cold eye on masculine pretentions to vocational superiority.

Secondly, there are conflicts engendered by feelings of inadequacy in fulfilling role-expectations, from feelings of uncertainty, ambiguity or confusion regarding male expectation. Norms of masculinity vary among social groups and there must be further and more precise definitions of masculine role-expectations.

The third source or way of examining the problematic aspects of masculine social roles is interpreting them in terms of accommodation to the new freedoms and responsibilities of women. The dominant-group: minority-group analogy is used to indicate that all is not well with the American male. The image of him is the strong, silent man. In moments of faltering he may turn to a woman but rather for ego-building than for counsel. Perhaps the greatest burden of masculinity our culture imposes is that the American male is "a red-blooded, gentlemanly, go-getter" and any confessions of doubts, uncertainties, or insecurities would tarnish this image, any sign of weakness might be taken as effeminacy.

In his role as a father and a son he has conflicts but perhaps his role as lover strikes at the heart of problems of masculinity. Virility used to be conceived as a unilateral expression of male sexuality, but is regarded today in terms of the ability to evoke a full sexual response on the part of the female. There are real strains in seeking to accommodate to, and meet the challenge of, the sexual emancipation of women. The urgency of the problem of impotence may arise also from the psychological need to buttress masculinity in the one area safe from female competition, and it may also be that sexual prowess represents an alternative to economic success in validating manhood. The "flight for masculinity" evident in male homosexuality may be in part a reflection of role conflicts resulting from a confusion of social and sexual roles.

In general, masculinity is more important to men than femininity to women. If a man is not masculine, not a "real man," he is nothing, but a woman can be unfeminine and still be a person. Everyone thinks he knows what is

masculine and how to recognize a "real man," but no one can give an adequate definition.

The author is engaged in research to uncover how men interpret the masculine role, their feelings about being men, what personality and social correlates are linked to various interpretations of the masculine role and the felt points of tension and strain. Social change has introduced certain cleavages between values and behavior, and the very forces which gave rise to these conflicts will contribute to their alleviation. Men are paying a price for the past lack of reciprocity between the sexes, and the future solution need not be the reversal of the caste line in a matriarchal society as some men fear, but rather the collaborative effort of men and women in evolving new masculine and feminine identities, which will integrate the sexes in the emotional division of labor so that the roles which men and women play will not be rationalized or seen as external constraint but eagerly embraced as their own.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

NOTES AND COMMENTS

An exceptionally helpful pamphlet has been issued under the title *The Problem of Disease: A Christian Approach.* The author is Harold J. Conlon, M.D. The essay is one of a series of faculty papers issued by the National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Copies may be secured by writing to the National Council, 281 Fourth Avenue, New York 10. Price—25 cents.

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The Friends Conference on Religion and Psychology was held at Haverford College June 13-15 under the leadership of Dr. Ira Progoff. The theme of the Conference was "The Life of the Spirit Today—Spiritual Growth through Group Search."

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The Rev. H. George Randolph, Chaplain of Emanuel Hospital, Portland, Oregon, received the honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity from Wartburg Seminary, Dubuque, Iowa, on May 28 in recognition of his contribution to clinical pastoral education.

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A Workshop for Clergy on Adjustment Problems of the Aging was held on April 28 at the Mendota State Hospital, Madison, Wisconsin. Dr. Gilbert B. Tybring and Dr. Carroll A. Wise were the principal speakers.

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The new United Presbyterian Church has a 14-member special committee on the relation of Christian faith to health. This committee points out that the healing ministry requires physicians and ministers to work together in mutual respect and understanding.

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